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I. INTRODUCTION

Delaware courts have largely privatized enforcement of
fiduciary duties in public corporations. In In re Fuqua Industries, Inc.
ShareholderLitigation,1 Chancellor Chandler expressly acknowledged
this judicial policy. He noted that Delaware courts implement it
partly by allowing private attorneys, working on a contingent fee
basis, to initiate and maintain derivative and class actions in the
names of "nominal shareholder plaintiffs." 2 Attorneys are subject only
to the relatively weak constraints that they must inform their "clients"
and receive their consent before they file shareholder suits. Further,
Delaware courts use cost and fee shifting mechanisms to
"economically incentivize"3 those attorneys to initiate such suits. 4

1.
752 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 1999).
2.
Id. at 133. Chancellor Chandler describes such suits as "a cornerstone of sound corporate
governance." Id. He explains that because Delaware allows such suits "corporations are safeguarded
from fiduciary breaches and shareholders thereby benefit." Id.
3.
Id.
4.
In this Article, we refer to the attorneys who specialize in filing class and derivative
actions on behalf of nominal shareholders as "plaintiffs' attorneys," the "plaintiffs' bar" or the
"traditional plaintiffs' bar."
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Chancellor Chandler also explained that Delaware courts have
adopted this policy because they believe that the plaintiffs' bar is
5
capable of performing a valuable "service on behalf of shareholders."
Plaintiffs' attorneys understand "abstruse issues of corporate
governance and fiduciary duties" 6 far better than do most
shareholders. Consequently, they are uniquely qualified to identify
situations in which principles of corporate governance have been
violated or fiduciary duties have been breached and then to initiate
lawsuits seeking corrective action.7
At the same time, Delaware courts have recognized that
encouraging private enforcement creates an obvious danger.
Plaintiffs' attorneys may make litigation-related decisions primarily to
advance their own economic interests rather than those of the
corporations or shareholders that they purport to represent.8 Such
decisions have the potential to impose substantial, litigation-related
agency costs on corporations, shareholders, and the courts.9
Concerns about possible litigation-related agency costs have led
Delaware's courts to impose two major constraints on shareholder
derivative suits. They have interpreted with considerable rigor the
long-standing requirement that a derivative plaintiff must either
make demand on the defendant corporation's board of directors or
plead with particularity why demand would be futile. 10 In addition,
they have held that a special litigation committee, appointed by a
defendant corporation's board of directors, has the right to investigate
plaintiffs claims and to seek dismissal of a derivative suit, even where
plaintiff has established that demand is excused.1" One explicit
purpose of both these requirements is to weed out opportunistic claims
-often referred to as "strike suits"-that may generate substantial fee
5.
In re Fuqua Indus., Inc., 752 A.2d at 133.
6.
Id. at 135.
7.
See id. (noting that "[o]ur legal system has long recognized that lawyers must take a
dominant role in prosecuting litigation on behalf of clients"). Although Chancellor Chandler did not
mention it, a more pragmatic factor may underlie the Delaware courts' approach. Those courts may
believe that it would be inappropriate to allow defendants to inquire very deeply about
communications between plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients concerning which of them actually
was responsible for any given decision to sue.
8.
In re Fuqua Indus., Inc., 752 A.2d at 133.
9.
Id. at 133-34.
10. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807-08 (Del. 1984) (holding that a complaint making
generalized allegations that directors were dominated and controlled was not sufficient to
demonstrate demand would be futile because the relevant facts were not pled with sufficient
particularity). Aronson established a pleading standard for demand futility that Delaware courts
have applied in numerous subsequent cases. See, e.g., Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 228 (Del. Ch. 1990);
Good v. Getty Oil Co., 518 A.2d 973,974 (Del. Ch. 1986).
11. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-86, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
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awards without producing meaningful benefits for the defendant
12
corporation or its shareholders.
Neither Delaware courts nor Delaware's legislature has
imposed comparable constraints on shareholder class actions, the
other principal form of representative shareholder litigation.13 Yet, as
Professors Thompson and Thomas point out in their innovative study
of lawsuits filed in Delaware Chancery Court in the years 1999-2000,
class actions and, in particular, acquisition-related class actions
appear to have become "the dominant form of corporate litigation,
outnumbering derivative suits by a wide margin." 14 Whether the
apparent preference of the plaintiffs' bar for class action arises from a
lack of constraints on opportunistic litigation, from a proliferation of
wrongdoing in connection with mergers and acquisitions, or from both,
is unclear.
At the time we first became aware of Thompson and Thomas's
findings, we were in the early stages of a study of one category of
merger-related class actions that we believed was particularly
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' bar-suits
challenging so-called "sales of control." 15 We had become interested in
this area as a consequence of the experience of one of us in connection
with two class actions challenging the fairness of transactions,
seemingly negotiated at arm's length, in which Delaware corporations
were sold for cash. Plaintiffs' attorneys filed complaints in both suits
almost immediately after the challenged transactions were
announced. In neither suit, however, did plaintiffs' attorneys find any
evidence to support their claims that the corporation had been sold for
less than the highest value reasonably available. As a result, in
12. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12; see also Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786-87 (discussing the need to
balance the problem of strike suits with the power of boards of directors to quickly dismiss suits).
This agency cost problem exists in large part because derivative claims often have the potential to
impose far higher litigation costs on defendants than they do on plaintiffs and their attorneys.
13. In contrast, Congress has imposed substantial constraints on class actions filed under the
federal securities laws, most notably by passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78). Among other things,
that Act imposes new obligations on plaintiffs who file securities class actions, establishes procedures
that allow class members with large financial interests to gain control of such actions, and requires
plaintiffs to meet stringent pleading requirements before discovery can begin.
14, Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-OrientedClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135 (2004).
15. That term is defined in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
42-43 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter QVC]. What constitutes a sale of control is discussed at greater length,
infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text, as is the fact that once a transaction qualifies as a sale of
control, the selling corporation's directors have duties-often described as "Revlon duties," see
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985)--to make
reasonable efforts to obtain the highest value reasonably available for the selling corporation's
shareholders.
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neither case did they obtain any monetary recovery for the plaintiff
class.
Instead, both cases settled because defendants agreed to
disclose additional information that, in both cases, tended to bolster
defendants' contention that they had sought and obtained the highest
value reasonably available for the subject corporation's stockholders.
However, despite the absence of any evidence of wrongdoing,
defendants or their successors in both cases agreed not only to settle
but also to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses, up to agreedupon amounts, if awarded by the court.
As a member of the plaintiff class in one of these suits, Steiner
v. CalMat Co., 1 6 and as counsel to one of his colleagues who was a
member of the plaintiff class in the second, In re Banctec, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation,17 Professor Weiss prepared objections to both
settlements. In both cases, the objections focused on plaintiffs'
attorneys' fee request. Both objectors argued that no fees should be
awarded because plaintiffs' attorneys initially filed complaints without
having any reasonable factual basis for the claims they had made,
that plaintiffs had found no evidence of wrongdoing, and that the
settlements in question provided no meaningful benefits to the
8
plaintiff class.'
Although both objections achieved substantial success,' 9 what
seemed more significant to us was that Delaware law appeared to
make it attractive for plaintiffs' attorneys to file class actions
challenging "sale-of-control" transactions whether or not fiduciary
breaches appeared to have occurred. A complaint that simply asserted
that a corporation's board had approved a "sale-of-control" and that
16. C.A. No. 16783 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1999).
17. C.A. No. 17092 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2000). The colleague was Professor Junius Hoffman.
18. Both objections relied heavily on Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del.
1980) and Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966). Dann held that, to guard against the
danger that the prospect of fee awards would encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to file baseless claims, a
plaintiffs attorney must demonstrate both that the action (or the settlement) confers some benefit
upon the corporation or the class and that the action, when filed, was meritorious. Dann, 223 A.2d at
387. The Court explained that "[a] claim is meritorious within the meaning of the rule if it can
withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings [and] if, at the same time, the plaintiff possesses
knowledge of provable facts which hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success." Id.; see
also Baron, 413 A.2d at 879 (quoting Dann's"standard for meritoriousness").
19. Plaintiffs' attorneys requested $525,000 in fees and expenses in CalMat; the court awarded
fees and expenses totaling $209,060.79; $175,000 represented fees, and the balance was for
reimbursement of expenses. Order and Final Judgment, at 5, Steiner v. CalMat Co., C.A. No. 16783
(Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1999) (Almost all of the unpublished documents filed in the cases cited in this
article can be found at either the Delaware Corporate Law Clearinghouse, http://www.corporatea
a free site, or at VirtualDocket.com, http://www.virtualdocket.com,
law.widener.edu,
commercial site.). Plaintiffs' attorneys' requested $250,000 in fees and expense in Banctec; the court
awarded $25,000. Order and Final Judgment, at 5, In re Banctec, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
17092 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2000).
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then alleged in general terms that the directors had not obtained "the
best value reasonably available" could not be dismissed because,
under Delaware law, such allegations sufficed to shift to defendant
directors the burden of proving that they had not violated their Revlon
duties. 20 Moreover, compendia of unreported decisions that plaintiffs'
attorneys in both cases filed in support of their fee requests suggested
to us that many other class actions had been filed on the basis of
similar generalized allegations of wrongdoing, had also been settled
for nonmonetary relief and-in the absence of an objection by a
"gadfly" such as Professor Weiss-had resulted in substantial
attorneys' fee awards. 2 1 In effect, we began to suspect that, at least
with respect to sale-of-control transactions, Delaware law created a
sort of safe harbor for strike suits. That is, Delaware law made it too
easy for plaintiffs' attorneys, in connection with any sale-of-control
transaction, to initiate a class action that would have significant
settlement value. Plaintiffs' attorneys could threaten the timing of
the transaction and impose on the board of the selling corporation the
litigation costs involved in proving that it had proceeded in accord
with its duties under Revlon. 22
Examination of a preliminary draft of Thompson and Thomas's
paper led us to broaden the scope of our study. Thompson and

20. See supra note 15 for an explanation of Revlon duties. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59, 71-72 (Del. 1995), established that, where Delaware law
imposes on a corporation's board of directors the burden of proving that an action it took comported
with the relevant standard of review, a complaint alleging in general terms that the directors' action
did not comport with that standard of review states a claim for which relief can be granted. The
defendant directors then must prove that their conduct comported with the relevant standard of
review. The Delaware Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this rule in Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d
277, 284 (Del. 2003), when it failed to dismiss a complaint alleging sufficient facts that merger of a
corporation was "'not approved by a majority consisting of disinterested directors.'" The court held
that the defendant-directors would have to bear the burden of proof at a later proceeding because
they could not show as a matter of law that the merger was approved by independent directors. Id.
at 284-85.
21. Plaintiffs' attorneys in both CalMat and Banctec filed (and served on Weiss) compendia of
unreported decisions awarding such attorneys' fees. The cases included in those compendia
suggested that objections were unlikely because defendants customarily agreed to pay any attorneys'
fees awarded, rather than to require that they be paid by class members or from some common fund.
Thus, class members had no economic incentive to object. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
22. We also suspected that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co.. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), gave plaintiffs an additional bargaining chip. Matsushita held
that a federal court must give full faith and credit to a court-approved settlement of a state law class
action, even if the settlement releases defendants from federal claims that plaintiffs could not have
asserted in the state court action. Id. at 385-87. Thus, Matsushitacould allow a plaintiffs' attorney
who filed a class action in Delaware challenging a sale of control to offer defendants, as part of any
settlement, a release from any and all claims that have been filed or might be filed, in any state or
federal court, challenging any aspect of the sale-of-control transaction. We found, however, that the
possibility of obtaining such a release does not appear to be significant.
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Thomas found that most of the class actions filed in 1999-2000 were
directed at mergers that involved some conflict of interest-a squeeze
out by a controlling shareholder, a management buy out (MBO), or a
sale of control to a third party in connection with which the selling
corporation's managers allegedly diverted a disproportionate share of
the proceeds to themselves. Relatively few class actions challenged
sales of control in the absence of self-dealing. We had already
hypothesized that plaintiffs' attorneys' decisions concerning whether
to file and how to prosecute merger-related class actions resulted
primarily from Delaware law-in particular, that the pleading rules,
burden of proof, and standard of review made it easy to file a claim
that would survive a motion to dismiss and provide plaintiffs with
economic leverage to press for a settlement and a fee award,
regardless of whether fiduciary duties had been breached. Thompson
and Thomas's data led us to hypothesize further that the presence of a
conflict of interest in connection with a merger would make it more
attractive for plaintiffs' attorneys to file a class action because unfair
self-dealing was more likely to have occurred. 23 In our view, that
potential also made it more likely that class actions challenging
mergers involving conflicts of interest had produced substantial
benefits for members of the plaintiff class as well as the attorneys who
filed them.
We further revised our hypotheses after we began to examine
litigation documents. They revealed that during the three-year study
period, boards of target companies in mergers involving conflicts of
interest routinely appointed special negotiating committees ("SNCs")
composed of independent directors and charged those committees with
responsibility for negotiating the best possible terms on behalf of the
company's public shareholders. 24 Plaintiffs' attorneys, however,
routinely filed class actions challenging such mergers as soon as they
were announced, without regard to whether the target company's
board had appointed an SNC or agreed to final terms. Moreover, if
plaintiffs file a suit anticipating a target's board will breach its
fiduciary duties, and if an SNC subsequently negotiates some
improvement in the terms of a proposed merger (as often is the case),
23. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 14, at 205-06 (finding that settlements resulting
from challenges to "friendly" takeovers resulted in higher payouts to shareholders because
conflicts of interest were involved).
24. This practice became standard in squeeze outs following Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983), in which the court indicated that the appointment of an SNC would go a
long way toward proving that a squeeze out was entirely fair. Professor Rock has documented that
by 1990, reliance on SNCs also had become standard practice in connection with MBOs. Edward B.
Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009,
1026, 1104 (1997).
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Delaware law presumes that the improvement is attributable in whole
or in part to plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts. 25 Consequently, even if
plaintiffs' attorneys accept as fair the merger terms an SNC has
negotiated, Delaware law allows them to seek compensation for the
26
benefits that their lawsuit is presumed to have generated.
This combination of corporate practice and Delaware law
provides plaintiffs' attorneys with substantial leverage in mergers
involving conflicts of interest. Unless defendants are confident both
that they can prove a negative-that plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts had
no impact on any improved terms negotiated by an SNC-and are
further prepared to incur the litigation costs involved in defending a
suit seeking attorneys' fees, negotiating an agreement to pay
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees probably will appear to present an attractive
alternative. Thus, in most mergers involving conflicts of interest and
especially in mergers involving sales of control, the combination of
corporate practice and Delaware law appears to have provided
plaintiffs' attorneys with substantial incentives to file class actions,
regardless of whether it appeared that fiduciary duties had been or
27
would be breached.
We also recognized, though, that the mere presence of these
incentives to pursue opportunistic litigation did not necessarily mean

25. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164-67 (Del. 1989) (establishing
principle in connection with a derivative suit); United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693
A.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Del. 1997) (affirming that Tandycrafts applies to merger-related class actions).
26. In United Vanguard Fund, a mutual fund whose challenge to a merger agreement had been
mooted when the corporation agreed to be acquired at a higher price brought suit for reimbursement
of attorney fees it had paid, claiming that its efforts had contributed to the improved result. United
Vanguard Fund, Inc., 693 A.2d at 1078-79. The Chancery Court had denied the shareholder's claim
and granted the target company's motion for summary judgment, holding that the benefit was not
causally related to the lawsuit. Id. at 1079. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Id. at
1078. It explained:
Where, as here, a corporate defendant, after a complaint is filed, takes action that
renders the claims asserted in the complaint moot, Delaware law imposes on it the
burden of persuasion to show that no causal connection existed between the initiation
of the suit and any later benefit to the shareholders. This rebuttable presumption
exists because it is the "defendant, and not the plaintiff, who is in a position to know
the reasons, events and decisions leading up to the defendant's action." Defendants,
therefore, have the burden of rebutting the presumption by demonstrating that the
lawsuit "didnot in any way cause their action." On a motion for summary judgment, a
defendant's burden is particularly heavy, because it must show on undisputed facts
that the assertions of the lawsuit had no causative effect on the subsequent benefit.
Id. at 1080 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
On remand, the Chancery Court found defendants had not met their burden and awarded attorney
fees to plaintiff. United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 727 A.2d 844, 857 (Del. Ch. 1998).
27. Similar potential to free ride on the efforts of others would exist where plaintiffs' attorneys
challenged sales of control or defensive actions and the target company subsequently was acquired at
a higher price.
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that plaintiffs' attorneys had been acting as "unfaithful champions" 2
of shareholders' interests. After analyzing all "acquisition-related
class actions" 29 in Delaware Chancery Court in 1999-2000 from a
somewhat different perspective, Thompson and Thomas concluded
that although such suits generate significant litigation-related agency
costs, they also produce large enough reductions in managerial agency
'
costs to "deserve a seat at the table of corporate governance. "30
To reach our own conclusion as to whether the costs associated
with merger-related class actions outweighed their benefits, we
undertook to examine intensively all merger-related class actions filed
in Delaware Chancery Court with respect to mergers announced
between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2001.31 We chose to cover
a three-year period, rather than the two-year period of the Thompson
and Thomas study, to increase the statistical reliability of our results.
At the same time, we thought that it would be useful for the period of
our study to overlap with that of Thompson and Thomas's study. We
also anticipated (correctly, as it turned out) that this was the latest
three-year period in which almost all merger-related class actions that
were filed had been resolved. Finally, the relevant principles of
Delaware law and corporate practices during this period remained
relatively stable. We would not need to adjust our observations to
take account of possible changes in Delaware law or corporate
practices.
We based our study on the neo-classical assumption that
plaintiffs' attorneys are rational economic actors, who because they
generally operate without meaningful client control, make litigationrelated decisions primarily to advance their own economic interests. 32
28. We draw this term from John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffas
Monitor in ShareholderLitigation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1985, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee,
Champion].
29. We use the term "merger-related class actions" to refer to suits challenging a transaction in
which one or more corporations is being acquired by or combined with another. It is our
understanding that Thompson and Thomas use the term "acquisition-oriented class actions" to refer
to a somewhat broader class of suits, including those challenging takeover defenses unrelated to any
negotiated acquisition or merger. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 14, at 195-96.
30. Id. at 208.
31. We limited our study to mergers involving at least $100 million, based on conversations
with members of the plaintiffs' bar that led us to conclude that financial considerations made it
considerably less likely that plaintiffs' attorneys would file class actions challenging mergers that fell
below that threshold.
32. Many other scholars have analyzed corporate representative litigation from the same
economic perspective. See, e.g., Coffee, Champion, supra note 28; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and DerivativeActions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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However, unlike the Delaware courts, which additionally appear to
believe that they can curb attorney opportunism through judicial
monitoring of settlements and fee awards, our model assumed that
other aspects of Delaware law largely shaped plaintiffs' attorneys'
litigation-related decisions. More specifically, we assumed that an
analysis of the pleading standards of Delaware merger law, including
burden of proof and standard of review, would allow us to predict the
kinds of mergers most likely to lead plaintiffs' attorneys to file classaction complaints, which merger-related lawsuits they were most
likely to prosecute actively, and when and on what terms those
33
lawsuits were most likely to be settled.
We then examined all mergers within our research universe
and all class actions filed with respect to those mergers to see if they
bore out our predictions. We made no predictions as to the
effectiveness of judicial monitoring, but we did attempt to assess how
effective it had been. Our overall conclusions are that Delaware law
relating to mergers and class actions created a litigation environment
that was rife with potential for opportunistic behavior by the
plaintiffs' bar; that plaintiffs' attorneys generally responded by
behaving opportunistically; and that Delaware's courts did not
effectively protect corporations or their shareholders from the
34
resulting litigation-related agency costs.
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes
the different categories of mergers that we studied, the principles of
Delaware law applicable to those mergers and to merger-related class
actions, and the practices that Delaware corporations generally follow
in arranging such mergers. It also contains our predictions as to what
mergers are most likely to be challenged by class actions, which class
actions are most likely to be prosecuted, and on what basis those class
actions are most likely to be resolved. Part III describes our research
Part IV
methodology and describes and assesses our findings.
concludes.

33. Our model is consistent with one developed by Guy Halfteck, in which he hypothesizes that
"[c]lass action law enforcement entails a sequence of multi-stage options to invest [similar to
financial call options] under conditions of multi-dimensional uncertainty." Guy Halfteck, The Law
Enforcement Venture: Understanding the Effects of Investment in Class Actions on Corporate
Liability Exposure ii (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion
Paper No. 452, Mar. 2004), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=497442.
34. In In re Fuqua Industries, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Chancellor Chandler made clear
that the litigation system that the Delaware courts have created depends on the Chancery Court to
take responsibility for ensuring that those agency costs are not "borne by society, defendant
corporations, directors or the courts." 752 A.2d 126, 134 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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II. DELAWARE LAW AND LITIGATION INCENTIVES
Delaware law can be viewed as initially dividing mergers,
acquisitions, and other business combinations-which we shall refer
to collectively as "mergers"-into two basic categories and then
subdividing mergers in each of those categories into subcategories.
The basic division is between mergers negotiated at arm's length and
those that involve a conflict of interest. Such conflicts exist either
because an officer, director, or controlling shareholder of the company
being acquired is, or is affiliated with, the other party to the merger or
because the merger allegedly involves some side deal with an officer,
director, or controlling shareholder of the target company. Within the
arm's-length category, Delaware courts apply different standards of
review to mergers that involve a sale of control, mergers directed at
fending off hostile takeover bids, and mergers that involve neither a
sale of control nor any defensive action. Within the conflict-of-interest
category, Delaware courts apply different standards of review to
mergers in which the acquiror is a controlling shareholder ("squeeze
outs"), mergers in which officers or directors of the target company
have an ownership stake in the acquiror but do not control the target
("management buy outs" or "MBOs"), and mergers in connection with
which an officer or director of the company being acquired has some
other financial interest that conflicts with the interests of that
company's public shareholders. Analysis is further complicated by
variations in standards of review in Delaware courts, which depend on
whether the merger involves only a tender offer or whether it also
involves a merger consummated pursuant to section 251 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") (a "statutory merger"), a
merger consummated pursuant to section 253 of the DGCL (a "short
form merger"), or some other action by the target company's board of
directors.
A. Mergers Negotiated at Arm's Length
A merger negotiated at arm's length with an unrelated
acquiror is unlikely to involve financial unfairness. Neither the
officers nor the directors of the target company have any incentive to
agree to a transaction that is not in shareholders' best interests. Both
the requirement for approval from a majority of the target's
shareholders and the fact that an unrelated shareholder's "friendly"
tender offer will succeed only if a majority of the target's shareholders
tender their stock further reduce the potential for abuse of
shareholders' interests. Thus, one might anticipate that all board
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decisions to approve mergers involving unrelated acquirors will be
protected from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment rule-that
is, that a court will presume that the board agreed to the merger in
good faith and after reasonable investigation.
A class-action
complaint challenging such a merger then would be unlikely to
survive a motion to dismiss unless the complaint alleged with
particularity facts that, if true, would raise a reasonable doubt as to
whether the presumptions of the business judgment rule applied. 35 A
complaint asserting no more than generalized claims that the board's
decision was unwise, imprudent, or uninformed clearly would not
survive.
Delaware courts, however, do not treat all board decisions to
approve arm's-length mergers as protected business judgments.
Rather, they distinguish between mergers that involve sales of control
and those that do not. Unless plaintiff can show that the merger or
some provision of the merger agreement serves a defensive purpose,
the business judgment rule will insulate from judicial scrutiny a
36
decision to approve a merger that does not involve a sale of control.
But if a merger involves a sale of control, Delaware courts will subject
the board's decision to "enhanced scrutiny." 37 More specifically, they
will require the defendant directors to bear the burden of proving that
they acted reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best value
reasonably available to the target company's shareholders. 38 The

35. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984):
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of
Delaware directors under Section 141(a). It is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting
the presumption.
(citations omitted).
36. A defensive purpose is one designed to fend off a hostile takeover bid or bids. See, e.g.,
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989) (noting that Time
considered various defensive measures including "a recapitalization, the acquisition of another
company, and a material change in the present capitalization structure or dividend policy" in
response to Paramont's hostile bid).
37. QVC defined the "key features of an enhanced scrutiny test" as "(a) a judicial determination
regarding the adequacy of the decision making process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the
reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing." Paramount
Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (1994). QVC further held that "[t]he directors
have the burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted reasonably." Id.
38. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985).
Corporate lawyers and Delaware courts often refer to this as proving that directors meet their
"Revlon duties," see Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1997),
and we shall frequently use this shorthand term to refer to this fiduciary obligation.
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business judgment rule will protect the directors' approval of the sale
only if they meet that burden.
Whether a merger involves a sale of control thus is a matter of
critical doctrinal importance.
The Delaware courts' rationale for
holding that sales of control are subject to enhanced scrutiny is that
shareholders' voting rights are of overriding importance because they
constitute the principal mechanism of shareholder participation in
corporate governance.
Consequently, shareholders should be
compensated if and when the corporation enters into a transaction -a
sale of control-that will result in the loss of these governance
rights. 39 Any merger in which shareholders receive only cash or debt
instruments in exchange for their stock thus qualifies as a sale of
control, 40 as does any merger in which the target's shareholders
receive stock in a corporation that, after the merger, will be controlled
by a single person, entity, or cohesive group. 41 On the other hand,
when a corporation with no controlling shareholder participates in a
merger in which its shareholders will receive stock for their stock and
control of the surviving corporation will continue to reside in "a large,
fluid changing and changeable [public] market," no sale of control will
be deemed to have occurred. The business judgment rule then will
apply4 2 unless the merger serves a defensive purpose.
Delaware courts review stock-for-stock mergers that serve a
43
defensive purpose under what is known as the Unocal standard.
They require the directors of the corporation taking the defensive
action to demonstrate both that "a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed" and that the defensive measure is "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed." 44 However, if "a defensive measure is not
draconian ... because it is not either coercive or preclusive," then in
most circumstances a Delaware court will find it to be reasonable. 45

39. QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-43.
40. That is, the transaction will qualify as a sale of control unless the corporation already has a
controlling shareholder.
41. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
42. Id. at 47. Professor Lawrence Hamermesh has found that the premiums paid in stock-forstock mergers do not differ substantially from those paid in cash mergers, which are classified as
sales of control. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some
Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 882 (2003). He
suggests that this rough equivalence calls into question the very different standards of review that
Delaware courts apply to mergers that do or do not involve sales of control. Id.
43. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
44.

Id. at 955.

45. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995). As the court further
explained, "The fact that a defensive action must not be coercive or preclusive does not prevent a
board from responding defensively before a bidder is at the corporate bastion's gate." Id. at 1388.
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In relation to arm's-length mergers that involved sales of
control, our hypothesis was that the applicable standard of review and
burden of proof would make it attractive for plaintiffs' attorneys to file
class actions alleging that the directors of the selling corporations had
breached their Revlon duties. A complaint that alleged the facts of the
proposed sale of control and made such a generalized allegation would
shift to the defendant directors the burden of proving that they had
met their Revlon duties. That alone, we estimated, would provide
plaintiffs' attorneys with sufficient leverage in some cases to extract a
nonmonetary settlement. However, because nothing would prevent
both the target company's board and its shareholders from seeking the
highest value reasonably available, and because Revlon duties are in a
sense self-enforcing, 46 we also hypothesized that few class actions
challenging arm's-length sales of control would result in any monetary
recovery for the plaintiff class and that, in at least some cases,
defendants convinced that they had not breached their Revlon duties
would signal their intent to contest plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, the
biggest potential payoff for a plaintiffs' attorney filing a class action
challenging a sale of control was likely to occur where, for one reason
or another, a competing bidder emerged and the company thereafter
was sold for a higher price. In that event, a plaintiffs' attorney-even
if her original claim that Revlon duties had been breached had no
reasonable basis-nonetheless would be in a position to claim a share
of the credit for the higher price and a fee award for her efforts.
Consequently, we hypothesized, Delaware law made it
moderately attractive for plaintiffs' attorneys to file suits challenging
sales of control. They could do so at relatively low cost; they might
thereafter find it easy to extract nonmonetary settlements (and
related fee awards) even if no wrongdoing could be found; 4 7 and they
might even "hit the jackpot" if a competing bidder emerged. At the
same time, especially because defendants who were confident that
they had met their Revlon duties often would be in a position to resist
successfully such claims without incurring substantial litigation

46. That is, an announcement that a board has agreed to a sale of control effectively puts a "for
sale" sign on a company, in that its board then has little ability to resist a higher offer from some
third party. Consequently, before agreeing to and announcing a sale of control, a well-counseled
board will first conduct an appropriate market check or survey of potential buyers. See Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985).
47. A defendant corporation also may find it attractive to settle such a case not only to
avoid litigation-related expenses but also because such settlements invariably include broad
releases of all claims that have been or could be brought in connection with the merger. They
thus provide defendants with a form of "litigation insurance."
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costs, 48 we anticipated that plaintiffs' attorneys would elect not to
prosecute actively a significant proportion of the complaints that they
filed challenging sales of control. Rather, unless a competing bidder
emerged (or some other unanticipated event or revelation occurred),
we expected that plaintiffs' attorneys would dismiss voluntarily a
significant proportion of the complaints challenging such mergers that
they filed.
We also recognized that it occasionally is difficult to determine
whether an arm's-length merger involves a sale of control. Examples
include mergers in which the target's shareholders receive some
combination of stock and cash (or debt) and mergers in which it is
unclear whether a single person, entity, or cohesive group will control
the surviving corporation. 49 When a class action is filed challenging
such a "hybrid" merger, some initial skirmishing is likely over
whether Revlon duties apply. This will make challenging a hybrid
merger less attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys than challenging a clear
sale of control but more attractive than challenging a stock-for-stock
merger that does not involve a sale of control. On the other hand, the
board that negotiates a hybrid merger may well be more concerned
with factors such as "strategic fit" rather than with obtaining the
highest value reasonably available, especially if it does not believe
that Revlon duties apply. Thus, a monetary recovery may be more
likely if a class action is filed challenging a hybrid merger and
plaintiffs prevail on the sale of control issue. On balance, that
possibility led us to predict that suits challenging hybrid mergers were
somewhat less likely to be filed than suits challenging clear sales of
control, but considerably more likely to be filed than suits challenging
stock-for-stock mergers. We also predicted that successful, Revlon48. If the selling corporation had a provision in its articles of incorporation exculpating
directors from monetary liability for breaches of their duty of care, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2001), then a suit alleging violation of those directors' Revlon duties would be highly
unlikely to result in an award of monetary damages. Once the merger closed, defendants could seek
judgment on the pleadings, because then the issue would be whether plaintiffs had alleged bad faith
or self-dealing, not whether defendants had met their Revlon duties. See McMillan v. Intercargo
Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2000) (dismissing a plaintiffs complaint that defendant directors
breached their Revlon duties in a case in which "a disinterested majority that engaged an investment
banker to search for strategic buyers, that consummated a merger agreement with a third-party
purchaser, and that put up no insuperable barriers to a better deal"). Plaintiffs' attorneys' most
promising tactic in such a case would be to seek to enjoin preliminarily the proposed sale of control.
However, in the absence of strong evidence that the defendant directors had breached their Revlon
duties, plaintiff probably would find it difficult to persuade the Chancery Court to issue a
preliminary injunction. Moreover, prosecuting a motion for a preliminary injunction would require
an expenditure of considerable time and effort by plaintiffs' attorneys.
49. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock
Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. LAw. 919, 926-31 (2001) (posing various hypothetical merger offers "to
illustrate the limited utility of the change of control test").
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based challenges to hybrid mergers were more likely than challenges
50
to sales of control to result in monetary recoveries.
The transactional form of an arm's-length merger is not likely
to affect the foregoing analysis. Whether a sale of control involves a
merger or a tender offer is unlikely to be significant because, so long
as the target company's board takes some action to facilitate the
transaction, the action it took will be subject to enhanced scrutiny
under Revlon. Similarly, if a board agrees to a stock-for-stock merger
that does not involve a sale of control, its actions will be reviewed
under the business judgment rule in all but one set of circumstanceswhen a court could conclude that the target's board agreed to the
merger or to deal protection measures primarily to protect the target
company from an uninvited takeover bid by some other aspiring
acquiror.
As noted above, Delaware law allows boards of directors
considerable freedom to take defensive actions, so long as they are not
preclusive or coercive. 51 Although challenges to defensive measures
usually fail,5 2 plaintiffs' attorneys still may find it attractive, for
entirely pragmatic reasons, to file complaints challenging stock-forstock mergers that serve defensive purposes. Even if it has installed
impregnable takeover defenses, 5 3 the board of a target company will
often give in to the pressures of the marketplace and abandon its
defenses when a hostile bid gets high enough. A plaintiffs' attorney
who has filed a class action challenging that companys' takeover
defenses then can claim credit for the target's surrender and demand
a fee equal to at least a modest percentage of the higher price that
shareholders receive, which may, in total, amount to hundreds of
millions or even billions of dollars. Thus, we predicted that plaintiffs'
attorneys would find it attractive to file class actions challenging
stock-for-stock mergers when, at the time the merger was announced
or shortly thereafter, a competitive, hostile bid for the target

50. However, because hybrid mergers are relatively rare, we also recognized that we were
unlikely to find many cases in this category.
51. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
52. Delaware law in this area is quite complex. A full explication of the relevant principles is
not necessary here, because decisions to challenge stock-for-stock mergers that involve such
defensive measures are more likely to be based on the pragmatic considerations outlined in the
preceding textual paragraph.
53. Impregnable board defenses include the combination of a classified board of directors and a
poison pill. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (2002) (explaining the effect of the
combination: "the pill blocks any stock acquisition beyond the trigger level, and the staggered board
forces the bidder to go through two proxy contests in order to gain control of the board and redeem
the pill").
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corporation had been made or seemed reasonably likely. If a contest
for control then developed, the plaintiffs' attorney could continue to
prosecute that claim but would, in all probability, largely free-ride on
the litigation efforts of the hostile bidder. Such a suit, however, was
likely to lead to the plaintiff class's realizing a very substantial
monetary benefit and to plaintiffs' attorneys' receiving a very
substantial fee award. Where no contest for control developed,
though, we anticipated that plaintiffs' attorneys would elect to dismiss
voluntarily complaints challenging defensive mergers, since they
would find it difficult to succeed on the merits.
We also anticipated that a similar dynamic would govern
challenges to stock-for-stock mergers that did not involve either a sale
of control or any defensive measure. Plaintiffs' attorneys might find it
attractive to file class actions challenging such mergers, especially
where the company being acquired was large in size, in the hope that
a contest for control would develop after the merger was announced
and the attorneys filing such suits then would realize windfall profits
largely as a consequence of the efforts of the competing bidder. On the
other hand, we anticipated that absent the emergence of a competing
bid, plaintiffs' attorneys would voluntarily dismiss virtually all such
suits, since a complaint challenging such a merger would be
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the business judgment rule
and thus would provide plaintiffs' attorneys with very little litigation
leverage.
B. Mergers Involving Conflicts of Interest
As we noted above, Delaware courts apply different standards
of review to squeeze outs, MBOs, and mergers involving other conflicts
of interest than they do to mergers negotiated at arm's length. As
concerns squeeze outs, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 54 holds that a
controlling shareholder
bears the burden of proving that the merger is
"entirely fair." 55 This is commonly described as the most rigorous
56
standard of review applied under Delaware corporate law.
Weinberger explains that entire fairness includes two elements,
fair dealing and fair price, but provides no real guidance as to how

54. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
55. Id. at 703.
56. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 785, 791 (2003).
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those two elements interact.5 7 However, the court's opinion hints
strongly that a controlling shareholder's best approach is to cause or
allow the target company's board of directors to appoint an SNC with
the authority to negotiate the terms of the squeeze out on behalf of the
58
target's public shareholders.
Not surprisingly, it soon became standard operating procedure
for the board of a controlled corporation to create an SNC whenever a
controlling shareholder announced its intent to squeeze out the public
shareholders and for the SNC then to retain legal and financial
advisors to assist it in negotiating with the controlling shareholder. 59
Practitioners generally viewed such actions as necessary, though not
sufficient, to demonstrate that a squeeze out was entirely fair.
Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.60 largely resolved
a related uncertainty-how proof that an SNC had effectively
represented the interests of public shareholders would affect the
standard of review and burden of proof that Weinberger had
established. Lynch I held that proof of fair dealing, meaning that the
terms of a squeeze out had been negotiated at arm's length by an SNC
with real bargaining power, would shift to a shareholder challenging
the merger the burden of proving that any price to which the SNC had
61
agreed was not entirely fair.
However, if a controlling shareholder decided to attempt to
effect a squeeze out using a tender offer without first obtaining the
support of the controlled subsidiary's board of directors, then
Weinberger would
not apply. Rather,
Solomon v. Pathe
Communications62 held that a controlling shareholder had no duty to
offer a fair price; its fiduciary obligations were limited to avoiding
"coercion or disclosure violations." 63 However, the court did not explain
when it would deem a controlling shareholder's tender offer to be
coercive, nor did any other reported decision discuss that issue until
57. The court states only that "the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair
dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of
entire fairness." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
58. See id. at 709 n.7 (suggesting that "the result here could have been entirely different if [the
company] had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with
[the controlling stockholder] at arm's length").
59. We are aware of no post-Weinberger case involving a squeeze out in which an SNC was
not appointed.
60. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter Lynch I].
61. Id. at 1117. Lynch I also confirmed that "entire fairness" was the standard in relation to
which that price would be reviewed. Id.
62. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
63. Id. at 40. The rationale for this distinction is that while a controlling shareholder has the
power to compel its controlled subsidiary to participate in a merger, it does not have the power to
compel the subsidiary's public shareholders to accept a tender offer.
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late in 2001. Thus, as to this one category of mergers-a squeeze out
effected by a tender offer for which the support of the subsidiary's
board of directors had not been obtained-the governing legal
principles remained somewhat uncertain during most of the period
under review.
On the other hand, for most of that same period, it seemed
clear that if a controlling shareholder decided to effect a squeeze out
by means of a short-form merger (whether as the sole step in the
squeeze out, if it owned more than 90 percent of the target, or as a
second step following a first-step tender offer), then the controlling
shareholder had a fiduciary obligation to prove that the short-form
merger was entirely fair. Only late in 2001, in Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration,64 did the Delaware Supreme Court reverse itself and hold
that a controlling shareholder had no obligation to prove that a shortform merger was entirely fair. 65 Consequently, as concerned almost all
the squeeze outs included in our study, the operative planning
assumption was that, at some stage in the process, entire fairness
66
would be the relevant standard of review.
As Professor Rock has pointed out, Weinberger and other
Delaware cases decided prior to 1990 also provided "substantial
guidance on how to structure a management buyout transaction."' 6 7 As
when a squeeze out is proposed, the board of the target company
should appoint an SNC composed of independent directors, which
should then retain its own investment bankers and legal counsel and
enter into negotiations with the MBO group.
However, at this point in the process, the responsibilities of an
SNC will differ somewhat from those of an SNC appointed to negotiate
68
a squeeze out. Almost every MBO also involves a sale of control.
Thus, an SNC charged with negotiating an MBO must keep in mind
its duties under Revlon. This both complicates and simplifies the
SNC's task. On one hand, the SNC cannot limit its efforts to
negotiating with the management group. It also must test the market,
in some reasonable fashion, to determine whether the management

64. 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
65. Id. at 248. After Glassman, unless full disclosure has not been made, appraisal is the only
remedy available to a minority shareholder dissatisfied with the terms of a short-form merger.
66. Indeed, the short-form merger in Glassman was negotiated by an SNC appointed by the
Unocal Exploration board. 777 A.2d at 243-44.
67. Rock, supra note 24, at 1062.
68. Indeed, transferring control from public shareholders to private hands is the principal
objective of most MBOs.
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group's offer represents the highest value reasonably available. 69
Moreover, if a third party expresses interest in acquiring the target,
the SNC has a duty to provide it with information comparable to that
available to the MBO group and otherwise to deal with that party in
70
an evenhanded fashion.
On the other hand, an SNC that meets its obligations under
Revlon generally will find it easier than an SNC that negotiates a
squeeze out to prove that the price it negotiated was fair. 71 In the
setting of an MBO, so long as the SNC proceeded reasonably, the
market test itself will constitute persuasive evidence that the target's
shareholders are receiving the highest value reasonably available-a
price that, by definition, also will be deemed to be fair.
In the case of a squeeze out, however, comparable, marketbased evidence will almost never be available because, under
Delaware law, a controlling shareholder has no obligation to sell her
stock. 72 Moreover, a controlling shareholder that is proposing a
squeeze out almost always will make clear that she has no desire to
sell. Consequently, squeeze outs involve greater litigation risks for
defendants. No matter how effectively an SNC has done its job, the
question of whether the price it negotiated is fair ultimately must be
resolved on the basis of the (inevitably competing) opinions of
plaintiffs' and defendants' experts. 73 That is a battle that defendants
74
sometimes will lose.
Despite these differences, Delaware law promotes a similar
transactional dynamic with respect to both squeeze outs and MBOs. In
both situations, it effectively discourages the potential acquiror from
69. This may make MBOs somewhat more vulnerable to substantive challenges than squeeze
outs. Although the standard of review applicable to an MBO is arguably less rigorous, in a squeeze
out, no market check is required because the controlling shareholder has no obligation to sell its
stock, even if some third party is prepared to pay more for it than the squeeze out price. See Bershad
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) (holding that "a stockholder is under no duty
to sell its holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the sale
would profit the minority").
70. Paramountv. QVC, supra.Of course, the SNC can limit access to proprietary information to
those prospective bidders that are prepared to sign appropriate confidentiality agreements.
71. This conclusion does not turn on any distinction between a price that is "fair" and one that
is "entirely fair." In our view, that is a distinction without a difference.
72. See supra note 69.
73. See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (commenting, with
respect to the analogous issue of valuation in appraisal proceedings, that "a recurring theme [is] the
clash of contrary, and often antagonistic, expert opinions on value" and that the Chancery Court "is
often forced to pick and choose from a limited record without the benefit of objective analysis and
opinion").
74. See, e.g., Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991) (finding no
unfair dealing but holding, based on testimony of plaintiffs' expert, that fair value of stock acquired
was $7.27 per share, not $6.00 paid by controlling shareholder).
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initially placing its best offer on the table. Both a controlling
shareholder and an MBO group will anticipate that the target
company's board will appoint an SNC. Both will also know that,
whether the SNC actually bargains vigorously on behalf of the public
shareholders or only goes through the motions, evidence that the SNC
succeeded in negotiating a higher price will make it much more likely
that a court will find that the SNC met its fiduciary obligations and
that the price to which it agreed was entirely fair. Consequently, the
price agreed to by SNCs in most (if not all) squeeze outs and MBOs
will be higher than the price initially offered, regardless of whether
any given SNC was an effective advocate for the interests of the
75
target's public shareholders.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, we hypothesized, would be familiar with
this transactional dynamic and would realize that it provides them
with strong incentives to file class actions challenging both squeeze
outs and MBOs as soon as they are announced. A "boilerplate"
complaint that simply recites the structure of the proposed
transaction, asserts that it involves a conflict of interests, and alleges
that the price offered is unfair or inadequate will almost always
survive a motion to dismiss and will also shift to defendants the
burden of proving that the proposed merger is entirely fair, in the case
of a squeeze out, or that the members of the SNC were independent
and that they obtained the highest price reasonably available, in the
case of an MBO.
Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys' bargaining power would derive
from far more than their ability to impose litigation costs on
defendants. In the case of almost every squeeze out and MBO, a
plaintiffs' attorney could anticipate that the price finally agreed to by
the SNC would be higher than the price originally offered by the
controlling shareholder
or MBO
group.
Consequently,
by
supplementing her complaint with a presentation to the SNC of her
reasons for believing that the target company's stock is worth more
than the price originally offered, a plaintiffs' attorney also could put
herself in a position to claim some credit for whatever increase in price
was then negotiated by the SNC and to demand compensation for her
efforts.

75. A recurrent problem in connection with squeeze outs and MBOs is that courts find it
difficult to determine whether an SNC has met its fiduciary obligations. William T. Allen,
Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:Are They Fact or Fantasy?,45 Bus. LAW. 2055, 2056,
2059 (1990). Then-Chancellor Allen also pointed out that the key to an SNC's performance often lies
in whether the attorneys it has retained have educated committee members as to what those
obligations are and how they should be met. Id. at 2060-63.
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Of course, neither a class-action plaintiff nor her attorney has a
right to present information to an SNC, since the committee, acting on
behalf of the board, is charged with the management of the
corporation. 76 Nonetheless, we found that SNCs regularly invite
plaintiffs' attorneys to present their arguments regarding valuation
before those committees finally decide on what terms they will
77
approve a squeeze out or an MBO.
SNCs may follow this practice because it can yield significant
tactical benefits. As described in the paragraphs that follow, Delaware
law gives plaintiffs' attorneys strong incentives to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") recording their acquiescence
in whatever deal an SNC has negotiated, so long as (a) that deal
involves a price greater than the price originally offered, and (b)
defendants acknowledge in the MOU that plaintiffs' attorneys efforts
"contributed" to the price increase. With such a MOU in hand, an SNC
can be highly confident that any deal to which it has agreed is
unlikely to be subject to further challenges. On the other hand, if the
SNC did not provide plaintiffs' attorneys with an opportunity to
appear, those attorneys would have no incentive to acquiesce in the
deal negotiated by the SNC, since by doing so they would relinquish
their claims without having established a clear basis for claiming
entitlement to a fee award. Moreover, especially in a case in which a
plaintiffs' attorney reasonably could argue that the improved price
negotiated by an SNC still was unfair, that attorney would have a
strong incentive to continue to challenge the merger. Thus, inviting a
plaintiffs' attorney to "participate" in its deliberations may allow an
SNC to purchase what might be termed "litigation insurance" at
relatively modest cost. 78 At least from the shareholders' perspective,
though, so proceeding poses a real danger. It could be a prelude to an
implicitly collusive settlement in which plaintiffs' attorneys, in
exchange for defendants' virtual guaranty of a fee award, agree to sign
off on merger terms that at least arguably are unfair and that they
might otherwise be successful in challenging.
Moreover, where a plaintiffs' attorney indicates that she is
prepared to acquiesce in an SNC's pricing decision, defendants
typically are prepared to acknowledge in the MOU recording her

76.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 141(c) (2001).

77.
In every settled case we examined that involved an SNC, plaintiffs' brief in support of
the proposed settlement recited that plaintiffs' attorneys had been invited to present their views
to the defendant corporation's SNC. See infra Part III.D. for further discussion of these
settlements.
78. Such 'litigation insurance" is low-cost if the attorneys' fees involved are unlikely to increase
significantly the total cost of the transaction.
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acquiescence that the efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys contributed to
some degree to whatever the improvement in price the SNC has
negotiated.7 9 This virtually assures plaintiffs' attorneys of a generous
fee award.8 0 Thus, by agreeing to settle for the price negotiated by an
SNC, a plaintiffs' attorney can obtain an almost-certain, substantial
benefit and will incur little in the way of costs. 8 '
At the same time, the structure of Delaware law operates to
discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from challenging the fairness of any
revised transaction to which an SNC has agreed, whether or not those
attorneys believe an SNC has effectively protected shareholders'
interests. A plaintiffs' attorney who insists on challenging a price
agreed to by an SNC inevitably will incur substantial costs without
any assurance that she will realize any benefits from her efforts.
Unless the plaintiffs' attorney can show that the members of the SNC
were not independent, she will bear the burden of proving that the
improved price to which the SNC agreed nonetheless is unfair.8 2 In
virtually every case, the SNC's decision will be supported by a fairness
opinion from some prominent investment bank. Thus, to prove
unfairness, the plaintiffs' attorney will face the added burden of
convincing the court that the investment bank was wrong. At a
minimum, a plaintiffs' attorney will have to incur substantial
litigation costs to mount such an effort. Moreover, since no MOU will
have been signed and defendants therefore will not have
acknowledged any positive contribution by plaintiffs' attorneys, if
those attorneys cannot convince the court that the improved price is
unfair, they are likely to receive no compensation whatsoever for their
litigation efforts.
79. Every settlement that we examined in a case where plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to the
fairness of an increased price that had been negotiated by an SNC included such an
acknowledgement by defendants. See infra Part III.D. for further discussion of these settlements.
80. Although Delaware practice precludes plaintiffs' attorneys from discussing their fees
directly with defendants at this point in the litigation, all parties will know that a fee request
inevitably will be made. When defendants acknowledge in an MOU the contribution made by
plaintiffs' attorneys, they effectively concede that, under the rule of Tandycrafts, see supra note 25
and accompanying text, plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to a fee award.
81. Plaintiffs' attorneys typically negotiate for the right to conduct confirmatory discovery
before finally signing off on a settlement. However, we found no cases (nor have we heard of any) in
which a plaintiffs' attorney, after conducting such discovery, decided to "walk away" from the deal
embodied in an MOU. In addition, the time devoted to confirmatory discovery, which--based on the
plaintiffs' briefs we reviewed-appears to constitute upwards of 40 percent of the total time that
plaintiffs' attorneys devote to cases that they settle, involves virtually no contingency risk, but
reduces substantially the apparent per hour fees that plaintiffs' attorneys are requesting.
82. Although in concept it also would be open to plaintiffs' attorneys to prove that the SNC had
not attempted to bargain effectively, as a practical matter we believe that plaintiffs' attorneys would
find it difficult to sustain such a claim, especially in the face of evidence that the SNC had succeeded
in obtaining a higher price for the public shareholders.
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As concerns both squeeze outs and MBOs, then, Delaware law
provides plaintiffs' attorneys with strong incentives to file class-action
complaints and to try to advance claims of unfairness up to the point
at which an SNC agrees to an improved price.8 3 Thereafter, Delaware
law discourages plaintiffs' attorneys from continuing to challenge any
improved deal to which an SNC has agreed, as the probable costs of
continuing to litigate will, in almost all cases, far outweigh the
probable benefits.8 4 Consequently, we predicted, plaintiffs' attorneys
would agree to settle virtually all class actions challenging squeeze
outs and MBOs in connection with which an improved price was
negotiated by an SNC after suit was filed. We also recognized that if
we found either that plaintiffs' attorneys had chosen to challenge a
substantial portion of the improved deals negotiated by SNCs or that
plaintiffs' attorneys were demanding fee awards equal to a substantial
percentage of the price increases to which SNCs had agreed,8 5 that
would strongly suggest that plaintiffs' attorneys' litigation decisions
were motivated largely by a sense of loyalty to the plaintiff class,
rather than by concern for their own financial interests.
We found it considerably more difficult to predict how litigation
would proceed where class actions were filed challenging mergers
involving other alleged conflicts of interest. Often, whether an
actionable conflict exists will not be clear. Thus, a plaintiffs' attorney
is likely to find it difficult to predict at the outset whether her claim
will be governed by the duty of loyalty or the business judgment rule.
This uncertainty seemed likely to make merger-related class actions
alleging other conflicts significantly less common than actions
challenging squeeze outs and MBOs, where both governing legal
principles and customary corporate practices were well established. It
also seemed that the presence of such uncertainty made it
significantly more likely that where such other conflicts of interest
83. As pointed out above, Delaware law also makes it attractive for an SNC to allow plaintiffs'
attorneys to "participate" in its deliberations with a view to reaching an agreement with plaintiffs'
attorneys before the SNC announces its formal approval of the terms of a squeeze out or MBO.
84. In Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 85 (Del. 1995)
[hereinafter Lynch II], the court affirmed a finding that the squeeze out in which Lynch was
acquired was entirely fair even though, in Lynch I, 638 A.2d at 1121, it had rejected claims that
the SNC appointed by the Lynch board had effectively represented shareholders' interests. The
court found no reason to question the Chancery Court's assessment of the conflicting testimony
of defendants' and plaintiffs' valuation experts. Lynch II, 669 A.2d at 90. We have found only a
single reported decision, subsequent to Lynch II, that involved an effort by a class-action plaintiff
to challenge a valuation decision made by an SNC. In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d
531 (Del. Ch. 2003). In that case, suit was not filed until after the cash out was announced and
judgment was entered for defendants.
85. For example, that plaintiffs' attorneys were claiming that all or a large portion of such price
increases were due to their efforts, rather than the efforts of the SNCs.
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were alleged, litigation would involve a judicial decision addressing
the merits of whatever claim plaintiffs' attorneys had made.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

A. Introduction and Hypotheses
The discussion in Parts I and II yields two broad alternative
hypotheses as to what drives shareholder litigation in Delaware. Both
start with the neo-classical economic assumption that plaintiffs'
attorneys are rational economic actors who act primarily with a view to
advancing their own economic interests. The first hypothesis is that the
structure of Delaware law channels the self-interest of the attorneys so
that they are genuine advocates of shareholders' best interests; that is,
these suits are brought by attorneys who are acting primarily in the
interests of shareholders and who thereby serve as an effective "police
force" to ensure compliance with corporate fiduciary duties. This
appears to be the vision of the Delaware courts. The courts acknowledge
that plaintiffs' attorneys may instead act in ways that primarily promote
their own interests rather than the interests of their nominal clients.
But, the courts claim, they are prepared to monitor the activities of
plaintiffs' attorneys, primarily through reviews of settlements and of fee
awards, so as to keep those attorneys focused on their beneficial role and
discourage them from behaving in an opportunistic manner. We label
this the shareholderchampion hypothesis.
We offer a second hypothesis that, we believe, applies to mergerrelated class actions: Delaware substantive law relating to pleading
standards, burdens of proof, and standards of review, when overlaid on
the system that Delaware courts have created to encourage plaintiffs'
attorneys to initiate and maintain private litigation, provides plaintiffs'
attorneys with strong incentives to act largely in their own interests
rather than in the best interests of shareholders, and plaintiffs'
attorneys have responded to these incentives in a predictably selfinterested fashion. Implicit in this hypothesis is the view that courts'
restraint on attorneys' behavior, through review of settlements and fee
awards, has been scanty and ineffective in curbing such self-interested
behavior. We label this the self-interested litigatorhypothesis.
To some extent, the two hypotheses have similar implications.
Both the beneficial and the not-so-beneficial forms of litigation will be
drawn to mergers where the pleading grounds are stronger, where the
transactions are larger (either because of greater potential injuries
incurred by shareholders, or because of the greater willingness of
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defendants to pay "modest" fees to settle nuisance suits), and where the
initial premium offered to target company shareholders is smaller
(again, either because shareholders may have suffered greater harm, or
the plaintiffs' attorneys may simply hope for more sympathy from a
judge and thus a greater willingness of defendants to settle). But, given
the relatively low costs of initial filings, the self-interested litigator
hypothesis would predict faster and more frequent filings when cases
are filed, as well as opportunistic efforts to free ride on the efforts of
others (such as SNCs and competing bidders) when possible. Further,
the self-interested litigator hypothesis would predict ready acquiescence
in any improvements that SNCs achieve, regardless of whether any
given SNC was diligent in promoting shareholders' interests, and few
post-improvement challenges.
To test these hypotheses, we initially collected data for the years
1990-2001 with respect to mergers where the target company was
publicly traded and incorporated in Delaware and the deal value was in
excess of $100 million.8 6 Next, we collected information on those
stockholder class-action lawsuits that were filed against a target
company following the announcement of a merger. The information
collected includes the date of the filing of the suit (or of the first
complaint if multiple complaints were filed), the allegations in the
complaint, the legal outcome, the terms of the outcome (such as the
terms of any settlement), the fees (if any) awarded to the plaintiff law
firm, and other relevant events. Because of the substantial data
collection burden involved in identifying, matching, and describing the
legal information where suits have been filed, we have restricted our
analyses to the years 1999-2001.
We initially examined the characteristics of those mergers (104)
that were challenged by lawsuits and those (460) that remained
unchallenged. These analyses are discussed in Section B. They indicate
that the bringing of shareholder class-action lawsuits in Delaware is a
systematic process-it is clearly not random-and that it follows the
patterns suggested above. The results of these suit-initiation analyses,
however, do not allow us to distinguish between our two broad
hypotheses.
We then examined the patterns of the 104 suits that were
actually brought. In Section C we describe broad patterns. Especially
worth noting among these are the high percentage of cases in which an
initial complaint was brought within two business days and the pattern

86. The source of these data is the Thomson Securities Data Corp. (SDC). The SDC merger
data are available for purchase from Thomson. We restricted our use of the merger data in ways
that are described in the text and in the footnote that immediately follows.
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of multiple filings of suits. In line with Thompson and Thomas, we
believe that multiple filings, as well as early filings of complaints,
suggest opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' bar. In Section D we
summarize our detailed examination of the pattern of settlements and
dismissals against the background of the categories of merger. That
pattern, we believe, is broadly supportive of the self-interested litigator
hypothesis. In Section E we discuss the five (of the 104) cases where
"real" clients, with substantial financial interests, were represented by
attorneys from outside the "traditional" Delaware plaintiffs' bar. The
differences in the ways that these five cases were pursued, as compared
with the pattern described by the remaining (99) cases that were
litigated by members of the "traditional" plaintiffs' bar, are again
supportive of the self-interested litigator hypothesis. In Section F we
evaluate how effectively the Delaware courts have monitored
settlements and fee awards in the cases brought by "traditional"
plaintiffs' attorneys and find that the courts have not been effective
monitors. Finally, in Section G we provide a summary and evaluation of
these empirical results and their implications.
B. The Influences on Legal Challenges to Mergers
The Thomson database yielded 564 mergers for the years 19992001 where the target company was a publicly traded Delaware
company and where the value of the transaction exceeded $100
million.8 7 Of these 564 mergers, 104 were challenged. We initially
asked whether the pattern of challenges was systematic-whether there
were features of these mergers that tended to increase the likelihood
that a merger would be challenged. Equivalently, these features would
be influences on the incentives of plaintiffs' lawyers to initiate and
maintain shareholder class-action lawsuits.
Following the discussion above, we focused on four potential
features of mergers that might influence the likelihood that the merger
would be challenged: First, all-cash mergers, as sale-of-control
transactions, would be more likely to attract stockholder class-action
lawsuits than would mergers where the acquiror offers stock to the
target company's shareholders. Second, lawsuits should be more likely

87. Where the Thomson database included transactions that involved a company that was
emerging from bankruptcy, a corporate spin-off of a subsidiary to the company's shareholders, or
some other unsuitable transaction, we excluded such observations from our sample. We decided
to include only mergers involving more than $100 million because plaintiffs' attorneys, in private
conversations, advised us that litigation involving smaller transactions was unlikely to be
attractive to the plaintiffs' bar.
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where the transactions are larger 8 (which could indicate greater
potential injury to shareholders and, in any event, would increase the
likely size of recoveries/settlements8 9). Third, suits should be more
likely where the share price offered by the acquiror (as compared to the
pre-offer market price) represents a relatively small premium (and thus,
again, shareholders may face greater injury, and plaintiffs' attorneys
may find a more sympathetic judicial ear). Fourth, the findings of
Thompson and Thomas indicate that self-dealing abuses are also likely
to trigger lawsuits. 90 Two likely indicators of self-dealing would be (a)
whether the acquiror owned a stake in the target company (and thus
might influence the target's senior management and board of directors
to accept an unduly low offer price); and (b) whether the senior
management (and/or board) have come to a prior understanding with
the acquiror as to post-acquisition positions and/or remuneration (and,
thus, might be unduly prone to accept this acquiror's offer and reluctant
to seek better terms for public shareholders--perhaps by "shopping" the
company around to other potential acquirors-for fear of souring a deal
with this acquiror). 91
As our discussion above 92 indicates, we recognize that these
variables have dual interpretations: they could support either the
shareholder champion hypothesis or the self-interested litigator
hypothesis.
Consequently, they will not allow us to differentiate
between the two. Nevertheless, they give us a first look at whether the
overall pattern of litigation is purposive and systematic or whether it is
largely random and inexplicable.

88. The size of the transaction itself-the amount paid by the acquiror--or the size of the
target (we employ four candidate size variables) may be the appropriate indicators here.
Preliminary analysis indicated that the broad industry category of the target (as represented by
the one-digit SIC code), for example, identifying whether the target was primarily engaged in
manufacturing, retailing, financial services, etc., was never significant as an indicator of the
tendency to bring lawsuits, and hence this set of variables was dropped from further analysis.
89. To paraphrase bank robber Willie Sutton, larger transactions are where the money is.
90. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 14, at 138-39 ('Viewed from a broader perspective,
shareholder acquisition litigation polices those management transactions with the highest potential
for self-dealing.").
91. Though the characteristics of acquirors might also influence the likelihood of a lawsuit's
being brought, characterizations of acquirors are not easily developed from the data because
many acquirors are not publicly traded companies and thus information about them is often not
available.
One characteristic that is available-whether the acquiror was a foreignheadquartered company-was included in initial analyses, but this variable yielded little
explanatory power and was dropped from subsequent analyses. Also, a "hostile" tender offer
should be less likely to attract lawsuits; however, the Thomson database does not distinguish
between "hostile" and "friendly" tender offers, so this potential variable could not be employed.
92. See supra Part III.A.

2004]

FILE EARL Y, THEN FREE RIDE

1825

1. Differences in means and medians
The available data for 1999-2001 are arrayed in Table 1,
according to whether a merger announcement was shortly followed by
one or more class-action lawsuits or whether the transaction was
unchallenged; the data for the individual years are arrayed in Tables 24. In addition, the means of the variables--for the mergers that
attracted lawsuits, and the mergers that did not-are portrayed
graphically in Figures 1-8.
We begin by describing the overall sample. As can be seen in
Table 1, there were 564 qualifying 93 mergers over the years 1999-2001,
of which 104 (18.4 percent) were followed by at least one stockholder
class-action lawsuit and 460 (81.6 percent) were unchallenged. The
mergers that attracted lawsuits tended to be larger, as predicted. 94 This
is true for measurements involving the mean as well as the median, and
for size measured by value of the deal, 95 the target's annual sales, the
target's net income, the target's total assets, and the target's value of
common equity. 96 The offer-price premium 97 was smaller for the
mergers that attracted lawsuits than for the mergers that did not, as
predicted.
The mergers that attracted lawsuits were more likely to be allcash deals, as predicted. Almost two-thirds of the lawsuits (67 out of
104, or 64.4 percent) followed all-cash deals, whereas less than a third
98
(131 of 460, or 28.5 percent) of the lawsuit-free deals were all cash.
Stockholder class-action lawsuits also tended to occur in mergers
where the acquiror had a prior ownership stake in the target company

93. As noted in Table 1, "qualifying" means that the merger target was a publicly traded
company that was incorporated in Delaware and that the deal value exceeded $100 million.
94. Larger transactions are more likely to yield larger recoveries/settlements. See supra
notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
95. This result supports our early decision to focus our attention on those transactions
where the deal value exceeded $100 million.
96. Because the assets of financial institutions (firms with an SIC Code commencing with a "6")
tend to be larger than those of nonfinancial firms and financial institutions' "revenues" may not be
comparable to nonfinancial firms' "sales," in our preliminary analysis we also computed means and
medians for only the nonfinancial firms in our sample (that is, with the financial institutions
excluded). The same patterns described in the text continued to hold.
97. Premiums are calculated as the percentage difference between the acquiror's initial offer
per share and the closing market price on the trading day immediately before the announcement
day, as provided in the SDC database. The SDC database also calculates the premium, based on
closing prices a week before the announcement and four weeks before the announcement. The
results are quite similar to the day-before data that we present.
98. An alternative way of portraying the data yields the same conclusion: of the 198 all-cash
transactions, 67 (33.8 percent) attracted class-action lawsuits; of the remaining 366 transactions,
only 37 (10.1 percent) attracted such lawsuits.
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or there were appearances of self-dealing, as predicted.9 9 Almost twothirds of the lawsuits (68 out of 104, or 65.4 percent) followed mergers
where the acquiror already had an ownership stake in the target
company or there was self-dealing, whereas less than 5 percent (21 out
of 460, or 4.6 percent) of the lawsuit-free mergers involved such
circumstances.
When the means and medians for the individual years 1999,
2000, and 2001 are examined, similar patterns emerge with respect to
all of these variables, although the levels of statistical significance are
more varied.
2. Regression analysis
Though differences in means and medians provide a useful "first
cut" at the data, these univariate comparisons do not allow for
covariation and multivariate analysis. Accordingly, we now turn to
multivariate (logit) regression analysis. 10 0
In Table 5 we show the results of logit regressions for the
combined years 1999-2001, and in Tables 6-8 we show the results for
each year separately. The dependent variable is a 1,0 lawsuit variable
(a merger where one or more lawsuits were filed = 1; a merger where no
lawsuit was filed = 0), and a variety of the characteristics of the mergers
are the independent (explanatory) variables.
As can be seen in Table 5, for the combined years, the most
powerful explanatory variable is whether the acquiror had a prior
ownership stake in the target company (or there were other appearances
of prior self-dealing). A variable that is related to the size of the deal or
the size of the target company (whether in natural numbers or in
logarithms) is also generally (but not always) significant. 10 1 Further, an
all-cash deal tended to attract lawsuits, as did the payment of a lower
premium paid for the target's shares; both variables are consistently
significant.

99. Because we have not investigated in detail the terms of every merger where a lawsuit
was not initiated, it is possible that there were some instances among these lawsuit-free mergers
where the target company's senior managers and/or directors also received remunerative
promises (and thus our tabulation of such instances may be undercounted). Nevertheless, the
differences that we find are so large and striking that we consider it unlikely that any
undercounting would change the significance of our results.
100. Logit regression analysis is a standard method of analyzing data where the dependent
variable is a 1,0 dichotomous variable. Further discussions of logit analysis can be found in most
standard econometrics texts. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 857-70 (4th
ed. 2000).
101. A high degree of correlation among the size variables creates statistical problems of
multicolinearity if more than one such variable is included in the regressions.
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The results for the individual years, shown in Tables 6-8,
reinforce the impression that an acquiror's prior stake and the size of
the transaction tended to be the powerful influences on whether a
lawsuit was initiated. The other variables' influences are more spotty
(in terms of statistical significance), although the plus and minus signs
of the coefficients (and thus the predicted direction of effects in terms of
encouraging or discouraging lawsuits) are consistent.
3. A summing up
The data on means/medians and the logit regression analyses
yield consistent inferences: a prior ownership stake or other appearances
of conflicts, a larger size of the transaction or of the target, the presence
of an all-cash transaction, and a lower initial premium offered to the
target's shareholders all influenced significantly the likelihood that a
merger would be challenged with one or more shareholder class-action
lawsuits. Although these results do not allow us to distinguish between
our two broad hypotheses, they do indicate that the initiation of these
lawsuits was systematic in sensible ways and was far from random.
C. A Brief Summary of the Lawsuits
As described above, there were 104 mergers that attracted at
least one class-action lawsuit. Of these suits, 48 settled, 54 were
dismissed, and 2 are still pending as of this writing. Of the settlements,
31 involved claimed monetary recoveries for the plaintiffs, and 17
involved only nonmonetary terms. These outcomes are described
graphically in Figure 9.
We will first describe some of the
characteristics of the overall sample of the 104 cases and then of the 48
settlements and 54 dismissals.
1. Speed of filing
An immediately striking fact is the speed with which these
complaints were filed: Of the 104 challenged mergers, 77 (74.0 percent)
attracted their initial lawsuit within one business day of the merger
announcement. An additional 7 mergers (6.7 percent) attracted their
initial lawsuit on the second business day after the merger
announcement. Thus, for the mergers that did attract lawsuits, almost
three-quarters of the time the initial complaint was filed within one
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business day of the merger announcement, and over 80 percent of the
10 2
time it was filed within two business days.
As do Thompson and Thomas, 10 3 we believe that such rapid/early
filings of complaints suggest opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' bar.
2. Numbers of complaints filed
For these 104 challenged mergers, multiple suits filed by a law
firm that is a member of the "traditional" Delaware plaintiffs' bar were
the norm. The mean number of suits per challenged merger was 5.7, the
median was 5, and only 12 challenged mergers (11.7 percent) were the
subject of only a single complaint.
Again following Thompson and Thomas, we believe that multiple
complaints suggest opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' bar.
3. Settled and dismissed cases
The outcomes of the lawsuits were close to evenly split between
settlements (48, or 47.1 percent of the 102 cases with known
outcomes1 0 4) and dismissals (54, or 52.9 percent of 102). None of the
cases was litigated to a judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, a second striking fact emerges from a detailed examination of
the dismissals: Of the 54 dismissed cases, 51 (94.4 percent) of the
dismissals were dropped before there was a judicial decision that
addressed the merits of the lawsuit; only three of the dismissals followed
an adverse judicial decision addressing the merits. Moreover, very few
of the 51 cases that plaintiffs' attorneys dismissed voluntarily involved
significant litigation efforts by plaintiffs following the filing of a
complaint or, in most instances, multiple complaints. This further
suggests to us that plaintiffs' attorneys' decisions concerning when to file
and whether a case warranted active prosecution probably were
governed more by those attorneys' economic self-interest than by clientoriented processes and thus provides support for the self-interested
litigator hypothesis.

102. Such rapid filings indicate that plaintiffs' attorneys spent little or no time doing
research or consulting with their "clients" before filing complaints. By contrast, in our analysis
(in Section E infra) of the five lawsuits prosecuted by law firms that are not part of the
"traditional plaintiffs' bar" and that represented "real" clients with substantial financial stakes,
we find that none of the five complaints were filed within the first or second day; the earliest
complaint (of the five) was filed six days after the merger announcement, the latest was filed
thirteen days after the announcement, and the median interval was nine days.
103. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 14, at 138, 154-55, 182.
104. This number excludes two cases that, as of this writing, are still ongoing.
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For the 48 challenged mergers where there were settlements, in
43 instances (89.6 percent) the first complaint was filed within two
business days of the merger announcement. In these cases, the mean
number of complaints filed was 7.3, and there were only 3 cases (6.2
percent) in which only a single complaint was filed.
For the 54 challenged mergers where all of the suits were
eventually dismissed, in 41 instances (75.9 percent) the first complaint
was filed within two business days of the announcement. In these cases,
the mean number of complaints filed was 4.4, and there were 9 cases
(16.7 percent) in which only a single complaint was filed.
4. Monetary recoveries
Of the 48 settlements, in almost two-thirds (31, or 64.6 percent),
the plaintiffs' attorneys claimed to have achieved or contributed to
monetary recoveries for the class, in terms of improvements in the
payments that the target's shareholders had received or would receive.
These claimed recoveries averaged $163 million, but ranged from a low
of $3 million to a high of $1,250 million, with a median of $50 million.
The size of the claimed recovery was positively and significantly related
to the announced value of the transaction and to the various size
measures of the target; but after the value of the transaction was
controlled for, no other variable played a significant role in explaining
the size of the recovery.
When expressed as the percentage of
improvement in the price received by the target shareholders, these
monetary recoveries yielded a 15.6 percent price improvement, with a
range of 0.8 percent to 50.0 percent and a median of 12.6 percent.
However, consistent with the self-interested litigatorhypothesis, we found
that plaintiffs' attorneys frequently were able to free ride on the improved
terms negotiated by SNCs or on the price improvements that resulted
from competing bids, that they rarely claimed a major share of the credit
for the improvements, and that they never persisted in challenging the
terms negotiated by an SNC or the terms proposed by a competing
5
bidder.0
5. Legal fees
For the 48 cases that settled, information on the legal fees
received by plaintiffs' attorneys was generally available. We portray
this information in Figure 9. As can be seen, the aggregate fees
received, as well as the hourly rates, were far higher for the settlements

105. See infra Part III.D.
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where monetary recoveries were claimed than for the settlements where
only nonmonetary terms were achieved. When viewed on an hourly-rate
basis, the fees also seem rather high, especially when one takes into
account the fact that we computed hourly rates on the basis of every
lawyer-hour worked, without distinguishing between senior partners
and junior associates, and in some cases also included hours worked by
paralegals. For settlements that involved no monetary recovery, legal
fees averaged $492 an hour, and the median fee award was equal to
$472 an hour. For settlements that involved a monetary recovery, the
average fee awarded was equal to $1,800 per hour for every attorneyhour worked and the median was $1,240 per hour. Moreover, our
examination of all merger-related class actions filed in 1999-2001
suggests that the attorneys who brought these cases did not face much
in the way of contingency risk. 10 6 Thus, our results suggest that
litigating merger-related class actions in Delaware Chancery Court
appears to be a lucrative area of practice for the plaintiffs' bar.
We attempted to explain the pattern of legal fees received, where,
alternatively, the aggregate fee per case and the hourly rate were the
dependent variables. Preliminary analysis indicated that, for those
settlements where there were claimed monetary recoveries, the
aggregate fee and the hourly rate were only mildly (and insignificantly)
positively related to the claimed size of the monetary recovery. 10 7 We
therefore excluded this variable from further analysis, which thereby
allowed us to expand our sample to include those cases where there were
only nonmonetary recoveries.
A formal regression model (using ordinary least squares) was
employed to explain the levels, alternatively, of the aggregate fee per
case and the hourly rates awarded. The values of fees, target assets,
and deals were expressed in terms of natural logarithms for the
purposes of these regressions. These results are found in Table 9. As
can be seen, a settlement that involved only nonmonetary relief yielded

106. As described in more detail in Section D, very few cases in which plaintiffs' attorneys
engaged in substantial litigation activity were dismissed. Most cases that did not result in
settlements seem to have been abandoned by the lawyers who filed them shortly after they were
filed. We recognize that, as a formal matter, plaintiffs' attorneys could not "abandon" these cases
without court approval. However, we found no case in which the court denied, or even appeared
to question, a motion by plaintiffs' attorneys to dismiss without prejudice.
107. The results with respect to the aggregate fee and the recovery are sharply different from
the results found by Eisenberg and Miller. They found, for a broader sample of class-action
lawsuits, that the aggregate fee per case was strongly related to the client recovery in the case.
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2004). One possible cause of the disparity
may be that Eisenberg and Miller based their study on reported decisions, while most of the
settlements included in our study involve unreported decisions. Id.
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lower aggregate fees and lower hourly fees, consistent with the pattern
found in Figure 9. In addition, aggregate fees and hourly fees tended to
be higher where the target was larger (as measured by the target's
assets) or where the deal value was larger. Finally, the hourly fees
tended to be lower in settlements where there was a court-ordered
reduction in fees (which is discussed at greater length in Section F
below), as expected, but the effect of this influence is not statistically
significant.
Two other features of these legal fees are worth noting. First, the
average size of the aggregate fees per case as a percentage of the claimed
monetary recoveries achieved for the 31 settlements where there were
such recoveries claimed was 4.6 percent, but the range was 0.01 percent
to 29.6 percent, and the median was 1.9 percent. There was a
significant negative correlation between the fee percentage and the size
of claimed monetary recoveries. Second, the average size of the
aggregate fees per case as a percentage of the deal value was 0.19
percent, with a range of 0.005 percent to 1.36 percent and a median of
0.12 percent. Thus, while plaintiffs' attorneys appear to have been well
compensated, the attorneys' fees that they received increased by only a
relatively trivial amount the total cost of these transactions to the
acquiring corporations.
D. A More DetailedAnalysis of Settled and Dismissed Cases
In an initial effort to describe the pattern of settlements and
dismissals--that is, to try to explain or predict which suits were likely to
settle and which were likely to be dismissed, based on the characteristics
of the challenged mergers in each category-we employed similar
statistical analyses to those described above: examinations of means and
medians of the merger characteristics and logit regressions. However,
there were no significant differences between the characteristics of those
challenged mergers where the lawsuits settled and those where the suit
was dismissed.
We also conducted a more qualitative analysis of the pattern of
settlements and dismissals against the backdrop of our predictions in
Part II concerning the probability and probable course of litigation
relating to the various categories of merger. To set the stage for this
analysis, we provide below a somewhat more detailed and nuanced
summary of the legal outcomes of the 104 instances in which mergers
were challenged:
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1999-2001 Challenged Mergers - Summary (104 cases total)
1. Mergers involving a conflict of interest- 62 cases filed (60%)
a. Mergers involving a controlling shareholder - 31 cases filed (50%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- 23 cases (74%)
(a)Monetary recovery - 18 cases (78%)
(b) No monetary recovery - 5 cases (22%)
ii. Dismissed without prejudice- 8 cases (26%)
b. Mergers involving other conflicts of interest - 31 cases filed (50%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- 12 cases (39%)
(a)Monetary recovery - 7 cases (58%)
(b) No monetary recovery - 5 cases (42%)
ii. Dismissed without prejudice- 17 cases (55%)
iii. Still pending - 2 cases (6%)
2. Mergers not involvinz a conflict of interest - 39 cases filed (38%)
a. Mergers clearly involving a sale of control - 12 cases filed (31%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- 6 cases (50%)
(a)Monetary recovery - no cases
(b) No monetary recovery - 6 cases (100%)
ii. Dismissed withoutprejudice- 6 cases (50%)
b. Mergers arguably involving a sale of control - 3 cases filed (8%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- 1 case (33%)
(a) Monetary recovery - no cases
(b) No monetary recovery - I case (100%)
ii. Dismissed withoutprejudice- 2 cases (67%)
c. Mergers involving defensive tactics - 12 cases filed (31%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid-4 cases (33%)
(a) Monetary recovery - 4 cases (100%)
(b) No monetary recovery - no case
ii. Dismissed withoutprejudice- 8 cases (67%)
d. Mergers not involving a sale of control or defensive tactics - 12 cases filed
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- 2 cases (17%)
(a) Monetary recovery - 2 cases (100%)
(b) No monetary recovery - no cases
ii. Dismissed withoutprejudice- 10 cases (83%)
3. Tender offers by a controlling shareholder- 3 cases filed (3%)
i. Settled/Mooted,fee paid- no cases
(a) Monetary recovery - no cases
(b) No monetary recovery - no cases
ii. Dismissedwithoutprejudice - 3 cases (100%)
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We will follow this organizational scheme in the discussion that
follows. 108
1. Mergers involving a conflict of interest
a. Mergers involving a controllingshareholder
Our prediction was that the typical pattern of such cases would
be that the controlling shareholder would make an offer to squeeze out
the public shareholders at a price lower than the highest price it was
prepared to pay. A class action would be filed challenging the fairness
of the proposed transaction. The controlled corporation would create
an SNC, which would retain its own financial and legal advisors,
provide plaintiffs' attorneys with an opportunity to make some sort of
presentation in support of their view that the initial offer was unfair,
and negotiate a higher price with the controlling shareholder.
Plaintiffs' attorneys would acquiesce in the price agreed to by the SNC
in an MOU in which defendants would acknowledge that plaintiffs'
efforts contributed in some fashion to whatever increase in price the
SNC had negotiated. Plaintiffs would also obtain the right to take
confirmatory discovery and, perhaps, to comment on the proxy
statement or tender offer documents that would be used to effect the
squeeze out. Following such discovery, plaintiffs' attorneys and
defendants would sign a formal Stipulation of Settlement, in which
defendants would agree to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses,
up to some agreed upon amount that would represent no more than a
very modest percentage of the price increase (and a considerably more
modest percentage of the value of the transaction), if awarded by the
court.
The results of these cases were largely consistent with this
prediction. All thirty-one cases involving challenges to squeeze outs
were filed by members of the plaintiffs' bar. Of the eighteen cases
settled for a monetary recovery, seventeen followed the above-described
pattern very closely.
The only settled case that did not was a challenge to Citicorp's
acquisition of the 15 percent of the stock of Travelers Property
Casualty Corporation that it did not own. 10 9 When Citicorp announced

108. A listing of the 104 cases that are the basis for this discussion is available from the
authors upon request. Most cases clearly fit into one of the designated categories, but a few
required judgments on our part. Assigning those cases to other, arguably more appropriate
categories would not significantly change the analysis that follows.
109. In re Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., C.A. No. 17902 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000).
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its initial offer of $41.50 cash per share, it also announced that the
offer had been approved by an SNC of the Travelers board. This
structuring of the merger effectively denied plaintiffs' attorneys any
opportunity to free ride on the efforts of the SNC. However, eleven
class-action complaints were filed challenging the fairness of the
merger and alleging that the SNC was a sham. Moreover, in contrast
to the other seventeen cases in this category, in none of which did
plaintiffs' attorneys pursue a challenge to the independence of the
SNC, here plaintiffs' attorneys filed a Second Amended Complaint
alleging that the Form 14D-9 filed by Travelers withheld and obscured
material facts regarding the independence of the Chairman of the
SNC and the fairness analysis prepared by Morgan Stanley for the
SNC. Here alone plaintiffs' attorneys also sought expedited discovery
and a preliminary injunction. That precipitated settlement discussions
resulting in an agreement that Citicorp would increase its offer to
$41.95 cash per share, which increased by $25.7 million the amount to
be received by the plaintiff class.
In essence, when the plaintiffs' attorneys who challenged the
Citicorp-Travelers merger could not free ride (because the Travelers'
SNC had blessed Citicorp's bid before it was announced), they were
prepared to engage in significant litigation efforts to challenge the
SNC's decision. They then acted like true shareholder champions
rather than merely self-interested litigators. That this was the only
squeeze out case involving a monetary settlement in which plaintiffs'
attorneys mounted such a challenge fueled our suspicions that in the
other such cases, plaintiffs' attorneys' decisions to settle, rather than
to challenge the improved prices negotiated by SNCs, may well have
reflected their rational responses to the incentives provided by
Delaware law, and not necessarily (or entirely) their good faith
judgments that the terms of those mergers were "entirely fair."
None of the five settlements that involved only a non-monetary
remedy followed the transaction/litigation pattern that we suggested
would likely yield a monetary recovery. Consequently, they are not
inconsistent with our self-interested litigator hypothesis. In three of the
cases, the plaintiffs challenged the procedures that the defendants had
followed in effecting the merger, and in the remaining two, an SNC had
already been formed and had approved the merger price before the
merger was announced. In four of the five cases, the plaintiffs settled for
additional disclosures11 0

110. In the remaining case, In re PepsiAmericas,Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 18280
(Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2001), the plaintiffs settled for a promise that there would be no downward
adjustment in the merger price.
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There were eight cases in which challenges to squeeze outs were
filed and then voluntarily dismissed without significant litigation by
plaintiffs' attorneys. In three cases, the proposed transaction fell apart.
In the fourth case, an SNC had already formed and approved the merger
price prior to the merger announcement, and in the fifth, the defendants
simply moved to dismiss and the plaintiffs failed to respond. There were
three cases where an SNC was appointed and negotiated an improved
price for shareholders, but where the plaintiffs' attorneys did not, or
were somehow unable to, free ride on the price improvements achieved
by the SNCs. Neither the litigation documents nor press reports provide
facts that explain these outcomes, but one possible explanation is that
the SNCs in these cases may not have given the plaintiffs' attorneys any
opportunity to participate in their deliberations and thus may have
denied them any clear basis to claim credit for the improvements in
price. In any event, the fact that these SNCs negotiated improvements
in the absence of active litigation provides some support for the
argument that some (and perhaps most) SNCs are prepared to represent
public shareholders' interests adequately without plaintiffs' attorneys
looking over their shoulders.
b. Mergers involving other conflicts of interest
Our prediction in cases involving MBOs was very similar to
that concerning squeeze outs. We also stated that it was more difficult
to predict the patterns or outcomes of cases involving other conflicts of
interest, other than that it seemed more likely that those cases would
involve judicial decisions addressing the merits of plaintiffs' claims
concerning the existence of a conflict of interests.
Especially if we exclude the three settlements involving
monetary recoveries that were not prosecuted by members of the
"traditional" plaintiffs' bar, our results differ significantly from our
predictions. Only a small proportion of the cases prosecuted (or
dismissed) by plaintiffs' attorneys resulted in monetary recoveriesfour of twenty-eight, or 14 percent-and a much higher proportion of
those cases, 61 percent, were voluntarily dismissed. The disparity, we
believe, can be explained largely by the fact that we anticipated that
the transactional pattern of MBOs would be much the same as that of
squeeze out mergers,1 1 ' but we found that not to have been the case.
111. This hypothesis was based, in large part, on Professor Rock's description of the
transactional pattern manifested in numerous Delaware MBOs. See Rock, supra note 67, at
1036-37, 1045, 1049-50, 1053-54, 1057-58 (chronicling several Delaware cases where the MBO
group announced its bid and only then did the target's board create an SNC to test the market
and negotiate with the MBO group).
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When a controlling shareholder proposes a squeeze out, it often will
have no good reason to keep its bid a secret, since it has no duty to sell
its shares and therefore no competing bid will be made. However,
when an MBO is proposed, or when a board is considering strategic
alternatives that may include an MBO, there may be good reason to
believe that the highest value reasonably available can be obtained
through private negotiations, rather than through a public "auction."
We inferred that this often was the case in the period under study
because a substantial proportion of the MBOs that we reviewed were
publicly announced only after an SNC had tested the market and then
agreed on terms with the MBO group. Although a plaintiffs' attorney
still could challenge such a merger by alleging disclosure violations, a
class action challenging the MBO price would be much less attractive
because no increase in price above the price already negotiated by the
SNC was likely, which would rule out the possibility of free riding on
the efforts of the SNC. In addition, in MBO cases (as opposed to
squeeze outs), an SNC often would find it relatively easy to prove that
the price that it had negotiated was fair: it could point to its efforts to
test the market to show that the price it had negotiated represented
the highest value reasonably available for the target corporation's
stock. 112
Of the seven settled cases involving monetary recoveries, four
were prosecuted by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys, and three were
prosecuted by attorneys who represented plaintiffs with substantial
financial stakes in the litigation. All of the four that were prosecuted
by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys involved MBOs or mergers with
similar characteristics. In three of them, consistent with our
predictions, SNCs negotiated increased offers after the MBOs were
announced, and in all three, plaintiffs' attorneys acquiesced in those
offers. In the fourth, Seagate Technology,11 3 plaintiffs' attorneys
obtained an order certifying the action as a class action, conducted
extensive document discovery, took depositions, and moved for an
1 14
expedited hearing on their motion for a preliminary injunction.
Defendants then agreed to modify the terms of a somewhat complex
MBO agreement, thereby providing $112.5 million to $200 million in
additional value to the plaintiff class. 11 5 In essence, as was true for
Travelers (discussed above), where the plaintiffs' attorneys decided it
was worth their while to invest in significant litigation activity, they

112. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
113. In re Seagate Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 17932 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 2001).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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were able to generate significant benefits for the plaintiff class. We
find it noteworthy, though, that Seagate and Travelers are the only
two cases in which "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts clearly
were responsible for producing significant monetary benefits for the
plaintiff class. It also is noteworthy that in both cases the attorneys
fees awarded were appreciably above the average-about 10 percent of
the benefit produced in Seagate and 17 percent in Travelers.1 16 We
will discuss the three cases that were prosecuted by attorneys
representing plaintiffs with substantial stakes in Section E below.
Of the five cases that were settled for nonmonetary relief, three
involved MBOs in which the price had been negotiated by an SNC
before the merger was announced and there was no subsequent
increase in price. A fourth involved an MBO in which the price was
subsequently increased but where defendants did not credit plaintiffs
for contributing to the increase. These four were settled for additional
disclosures, revisions of deal protection terms, or various other forms
of nonmonetary relief. In the fifth case, Captec Net Lease Realty, 117
plaintiffs challenged the fairness of a side deal involving the sale of
certain assets to the target's CEO.lls
After the court granted
plaintiffs' motion for expedited discovery, which suggests that it
thought plaintiffs' claims had some merit, the parties settled for
supplemental disclosure and payment by defendants of plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and expenses.119
Of the seventeen cases that were voluntarily dismissed,
thirteen involved MBOs. In twelve of those, the terms of the merger
had been negotiated by an SNC (or the target's full board in one case)
prior to public announcement of the proposed merger. In the other,
Authentic Fitness, 20 the target's SNC negotiated a modest increase in
price that plaintiffs' attorneys then challenged in an amended
complaint. 12' However, when defendants moved to dismiss, plaintiffs'
attorneys did not file a response. 122 They subsequently moved to
dismiss without prejudice. In White Cap Industries,'23 one of the
116. Id; In re Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., C.A. No. 17902 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000).
117. In re Captec Net Lease Realty Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 19008 (Del. Ch. July 26,
2002).
118. Id.
119. Commercial Net Lease Realty, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2002 (Form 10-K), File
No. 1-11290, at 8, availableat http://www.sec.gov/cgi-binlsrch-edgar.
120. Brickell Partners v. Wachner (In re Authentic Fitness Group, Inc. S'holder Litig.), C.A.
No. 17464 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 2000).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. In re White Cap Indus., C.A. No. 17329 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000).
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twelve, plaintiffs' attorneys also filed an amended complaint
challenging the independence of the members of the SNC and the
fairness of the price. 124 However, as in Authentic Fitness, when
defendants filed and briefed a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' attorneys
did not respond on the merits and subsequently moved to dismiss
without prejudice.
The other four dismissed cases involved allegations of other
kinds of self-dealing in connection with mergers. In only one of them,
1 25
was there a significant level of litigation
BHC Communications,
activity.
2. Mergers not involving a conflict of interest
a. Mergers clearly involving a sale of control
We predicted that challenges to mergers involving arm's-length
sales of control were not likely to result in monetary recoveries, absent
the emergence of a competing offer, but that complaints making such
allegations would have some settlement value because they would
allow plaintiffs' attorneys to impose on defendants the litigation costs
involved in proving that they had met their Revlon duties and would
also provide defendants with an opportunity to obtain "litigation
insurance" at a relatively modest cost.
Our results were largely consistent with that prediction. In no
such case did a competing bid emerge. Six (50 percent) of the cases
settled, but none of those settlements involved any monetary recovery.
Four of the settlements involved additional disclosures, none of which
appeared to support plaintiffs' initial claims of unfairness. In the
remaining two settlements, plaintiffs' attorneys negotiated provisions
that had some potential to produce improved terms for public
shareholders but that in reality yielded nothing.
Of the six (50 percent) cases that were voluntarily dismissed
without prejudice, none involved a target for which a higher bid was
made after suit was filed. In two, plaintiffs' attorneys moved to
dismiss after defendants filed and briefed motions to dismiss.

124. Id.
125. In re BHC Communications Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 18209 (Del. Ch. June 28,
2001).
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b. Mergers arguably involving a sale of control.
We predicted that challenges to transactions in this category
would be less attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys because they would
likely be required to litigate on the merits the question of whether
Revlon applied, but that they also would be more likely to result in
monetary recovery if plaintiffs succeeded on that issue, since the
target's board probably would not have sought the highest value
reasonably available.
Only three mergers in this category were challenged. One case
settled, and the other two were dismissed. The settled case, IXC
of
Communications,126 was largely prosecuted by a former executive 127
IXC who held 2.4 percent of its stock, worth roughly $44 million.
(We will discuss it further in Section E below). In the two cases that
were dismissed voluntarily, plaintiffs' attorneys claimed that the
defendant corporations had agreed to sales of control without
complying with Revlon. In neither case did a competing bid emerge,
and in neither case did plaintiffs' attorneys engage in significant
litigation activities after filing their complaints.
c. Mergers involving defensive tactics
We predicted that plaintiffs' attorneys would challenge mergers
in this category either because a competing bid seemed likely (or was
pending) or in the hope that a competing bid would emerge. If one did,
we predicted that plaintiffs' attorneys probably would be in a position
to realize substantial fees largely as a result of the efforts of the
competing bidder. If no bid emerged, we predicted that they would
probably abandon their claims by moving to dismiss without prejudice
because success on the merits would be unlikely.
Our results largely were consistent with these predictions. Of
the four class actions that resulted in monetary settlements, three
challenged mergers or defensive tactics where a hostile bid had been
made, and the fourth challenged a merger that was subsequently
challenged by a hostile bidder. In all four cases, the hostile bidder
assumed primary responsibility for challenging the target company's
defensive tactics, and in all four cases the target company was
acquired for a higher price. Nevertheless, plaintiffs' attorneys sought
and received substantial fees of $1,050,000 ($1,085 per hour),
$3,750,000 ($2,750 per hour), $9,450,000 ($1,630 per hour) and

126. In re IXC Communications, Inc. Sholder Litig., C.A. No. 17324 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2000).
127. Id.
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$625,000 (hourly information was not available), the last of which was
paid by the acquiror after the original merger was abandoned and the
target agreed to a second, friendly deal at a higher price.
In three of the eight cases that were dismissed, no higher bid
emerged. Higher bids were made for the defendant corporations in
three others, and an arguably higher bid was made for the defendant
in a fourth. Further, in a fifth case, Newport News Shipbuilding,128 a
hostile bid of equal value succeeded after the Department of Defense,
whose support was critical, expressed its support for the second
bidder. 129 One plausible explanation for why plaintiffs' attorneys did
not engage in more significant litigation activity in these four (or five)
cases relates to the fact that in none of them did the successful bidder
initiate a lawsuit challenging its target's allegedly improper defensive
actions. This suggests that the bidders did not view those defenses as
significant impediments, which also would tend to undercut any
Unocal claims made by plaintiffs' attorneys. In addition, in the
absence of lawsuits by the bidders, plaintiffs' attorneys had no
opportunity to free ride on the litigation efforts of others.
d. Mergers not involving a sale of control or defensive tactics
Our predictions concerning these cases were similar to those
concerning cases challenging mergers involving defensive tactics:
plaintiffs' attorneys would file on spec, free ride if a competing bid
emerged, and otherwise move to dismiss without prejudice because
they would have little prospect of success on the merits.
Our results were entirely consistent with these predictions
insofar as they related to the ten cases that were dismissed. None of
the defendant corporations became the target of a competing bid, and
in none of those cases was there significant litigation activity by
plaintiffs' attorneys after the complaints were filed.
The two cases that were settled for monetary recoveries did not
involve competing bids but nonetheless were not inconsistent with our
predictions. Both grew out of post-announcement events that could not
easily have been anticipated when the class actions originally were
filed. It is noteworthy that in both cases the plaintiffs' attorneys
accepted relatively modest fees.

128. In re Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18871 (Del. Ch. Dec.
12, 2002).
129. Id.
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3. Tender offers by a controlling shareholder
We predicted that cases challenging tender offers by controlling
shareholders were more likely to result in, and effectively to be
resolved by, substantive litigation because the law concerning such
transactions was relatively unsettled for most of the period we
studied. That proved to be the case.
Three such tender offers were challenged. In two, preliminary
injunctions were sought and denied. Both cases were thereafter
dismissed (although, in one case, the tender offer also failed). In the
third case, plaintiffs' attorneys engaged in some litigation activity,
including taking one deposition, but then moved to dismiss without
prejudice.
E. Cases with "'Real" Plaintiffs
In addition to the analyses described in Section D, we also
examined class actions prosecuted by law firms that are not part of the
"traditional" plaintiffs' bar 130 on behalf of clients with substantial
financial stakes in the outcomes of those actions. 131 Our thought was
that if attorneys representing "real" clients prosecuted class actions in
much the same fashion as did "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys, then
that would suggest that "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys were acting as
faithful champions of shareholders' interests, while if the actions
differed
representing "real" clients
prosecuted by attorneys
significantly, then the differences would suggest that "traditional"
plaintiffs' attorneys act more like self-interested litigators.
We found five cases that were actively prosecuted on behalf of
clients with substantial financial interests by law firms not generally
identified as part of the "traditional" plaintiffs' bar. 132 In two cases,

130. In TCW Technology Ltd. Partnershipv. Intermedia Communications, Inc., Nos. 18336,
18289, & 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000), the court used this term to refer
to law firms that we have also referred to as "plaintiffs' attorneys" or the "plaintiffs' bar." See infra
note 4.
131. Given that we found only five cases in this category, no meaningful statistical analysis is
possible. See infra notes 132-137 and accompanying text. However, we believe that qualitative
comparison of the two groups of cases provides significant support for the self-interested litigator
hypothesis.
132. The named plaintiffs' stakes were particularly large in In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation C.A. No. 18336 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2000) (more than 4 percent), In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 17324 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2000) (more than 2 percent)
and In re SFX Entertainment Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 17818 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2000)
(about 2 percent). Plaintiffs' stock was valued at more than $4 million in In re Siliconix Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001) and
about $1 million in In re Telecorp PCS Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 19260 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16,
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Digex'3 3 and Telecorp PCS, 1 34 such law firms acted as lead counsel for
the plaintiff class. In two other cases, IXC Communications
Corporation 35 and SFX Entertainment Incorporated,136 such law firms
were not appointed lead counsel for the class but were allowed to
litigate on behalf of their clients, subject to a requirement that they
coordinate their efforts with those of lead counsel for the plaintiff class.
In the fifth case, Siliconix,137 such a law firm's client was appointed lead
plaintiff, and the firm was appointed co-lead counsel, together with a
firm generally identified as part of the "traditional" plaintiffs' bar.
The pattern of litigation in these five cases differed remarkably
from that in the other cases we studied. In none of them did the "real"
client file its complaint on the first or second day after the challenged
merger was announced. The earliest complaint was filed six days later,
the latest was filed thirteen days later, and the median interval
between announcement and filing was nine days. This suggested to us
that substantial consultation between these attorneys and their clients
probably had occurred before the clients authorized the filing of a
complaint. Moreover, the complaints themselves tended to be
considerably more detailed than the "bare bones" complaints initially
filed in these five actions or the complaints typically filed in other
merger-related cases by the "traditional" plaintiffs' bar.
The nature of the claims asserted by these substantial
shareholders also was very different from the merger-related claims
most frequently asserted by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys challenges to the fairness of the price offered or agreed to in squeeze
outs, MBOs, and arm's-length mergers. The substantial shareholders
tended to make highly fact-specific claims that raised unique, rather
than generic, legal or factual issues. Plaintiffs in Digex, SFX
Entertainment, and Telecorp PCS alleged that defendants had engaged
in unfair self-dealing on the basis of facts specific to each of those
2001). We found only two plaintiffs represented by members of the traditional plaintiffs' bar that
held stakes similar in size to those in Siliconix and Telecorp PCS.
133. In re Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18336 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2000).
134. In re Telecorp PCS Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 19260 (Del. Ch.Nov. 16, 2001). The firm
named lead counsel resolved a conflict over that position by agreeing that, while it would serve as
lead counsel, it and Abbey Gardy, a traditional plaintiffs' firm, would jointly be designated 'Plaintiffs'
Executive Committee." Letter from Joel Friedlander, Esq., to Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Dec.
20, 2001) (forwarding Order of Consolidation that so provides and noting that language of the
proposed order "has been agreed upon by Abbey & Gardy, LLP").
135. Crawford v. Bell (In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig.), C.A. Nos. 17324, 17334,
1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
136. Franklin Adviser, Inc. v. Sillerman, C.A. No. 17878 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2000); In re SFX
Entertainment Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 17818 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2000).
137. In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *1 (Del. Ch. June
21, 2001)
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transactions. 138 Plaintiff in IXC Communications made an unusual
claim to the effect that IXC's board had agreed to sell the company in a
stock-for-stock transaction solely for the purpose of avoiding its
obligations under Revlon and also charged the acquiror with improperly
paying cash, rather than stock, to another large shareholder to induce it
to vote in support of the merger. Only Siliconix involved a challenge to
the fairness of the price being offered, and that case involved a tender
offer by a controlling shareholder-a setting in which, as noted above,
considerable uncertainty existed as to the governing legal principles.
The attorneys representing all five of these substantial
shareholder-plaintiffs engaged in extensive litigation activity following
the filing of their complaints--actions consistent with a belief that the
claims asserted had more than nuisance value. In three cases, Digex,
1XC Communications, and Siliconix, the attorneys representing the
plaintiffs engaged in substantial expedited discovery and then briefed
and argued substantive motions for preliminary injunctive relief,
succeeding in part in Digex but not in IXC Communications or
Siliconix.139 In SFX Entertainment, the attorneys for the shareholderplaintiff also conducted expedited discovery and then moved for
summary judgment, precipitating a substantial settlement.140 In
Telecorp PCS, the plaintiffs' attorneys successfully defended a motion to
dismiss and thereafter engaged in substantial litigation activity in
support of their claims. In contrast, in only three of the other ninetynine cases that we studied did "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys brief

138. In re Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. 18336 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2000).; In re Telecorp PCS
Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 19260 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2001). Plaintiff in SFX Entertainment also
alleged that the challenged merger violated a provision of the target corporation's articles of
incorporation. Class Action Complaint, at 31-34, In re SFX Entertainment Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
C.A. No. 17818, (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2000).
139. In re Digex, Inc. Sholders Litig., C.A. 18336 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 2000); In re IXC
Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1999 WL 1009174, at *1; In re Siliconix, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
C.A. No. 18720 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2001). We should note that the court in JXC was harshly critical of
plaintiffs' Revlon claim, stating: "To say that this claim is a serious factual stretch is as understated
as I can be ....Plaintiffs need a serious reality check." In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders
Litig., 1999 WL 1009174, at *7. The court also acknowledged that vote buying seemed to have
occurred, but held that it was not improper for an acquiror to buy a shareholder's vote. Id. at *8-9. It
may be that the plaintiff in IXC, an individual, aggressively litigated his rather tenuous Revlon claim
because he had so much at stake. His personal holding in 1XC stock, based on the terms of the
proposed merger, was worth more than $400 million.
140. The Franklin Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of the Settlement and in Support
of the Petition for the Award of an Attorneys' Fee, at 4-5, Franklin Adviser, Inc. v. Sillerman, C.A.
No. 17878 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2000). Defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff class an amount equal to
roughly 50 percent of the damages claimed.
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and argue similar substantive motions,1 41 and in only one case did a
"traditional" plaintiffs' attorney succeed in whole or part with respect to
such a motion.142

When the cases prosecuted on behalf of substantial plaintiffs
were settled, the nature of the settlements and fee arrangements also
differed substantially from the norm in cases prosecuted by the
"traditional" plaintiffs' bar. Three of these cases resulted in very
substantial recoveries-$165 million in Digex, $47.5 million in Telecorp
PCS, and $34.5 million in SFX.14 3 Moreover, in all three of these cases
the substantial plaintiffs attorneys claimed that the recoveries were
due solely to their efforts14 4 -a claim that was made in connection with
only two of the twenty-seven settlements involving monetary recoveries
that were negotiated by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys. 145 In all three
141. We do not count in this total two cases in which hostile bidders briefed and argued motions
relating to the validity of a target's takeover defenses and plaintiffs' attorneys also filed briefs and
argued the same motions.
142. In Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 41-42 (Del. Ch. 2002), plaintiffs' attorneys successfully
defeated defendant's motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims relating to the acquisition of
General Cigar.
143. Plaintiffs in Siliconix voluntarily dismissed their suit after the court denied their motion for
a preliminary injunction and stated that they were not likely to succeed on the merits. See In re
Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *1, *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001) for
denial of preliminary injunction. The parties filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order of Dismissal
Without Prejudice on December 17, 2002. Crawford and the plaintiff class's claims in IXC became
moot when the value of the stock received by IXC shareholders increased sharply following the
closing of the contested merger. They agreed to dismiss their substantive claims, but asserted that
they were entitled to a fee award, under Tandycrafts. Cincinnati Bell, which had acquired IXC,
agreed to pay $490,000 in fees and $75,000 in expenses to resolve the latter claim. Stipulation and
Order re: Proposed Dismissal, at 4-5, In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 17324
(Del. Ch. May 23, 2000). The court approved the parties' agreement in an Order dated May 24, 2000.
144. The SNC appointed by Digex's board contested this claim, asserting that it was responsible
for a substantial portion of the amount recovered by the plaintiff class and that, in any event, the fee
sought was excessive. The Special Committee's Brief in Oppositionto Plaintiffs'FeeApplication, In re
Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18336 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2001] The court may well have credited
one or the other of these arguments, in that it reduced plaintiffs' fee request by 50 percent. Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, In re Digex, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18336
(Del. Ch. Apr. 6, 2001].
145. In re Seagate Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 17932; In re Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp.,
C.A. No. 17902. We have not placed Wolfson v. Cunningham, C.A. No. 17155, (Del. Ch. Jan. 13,
2000) in this category, although it could be argued that plaintiffs' attorneys there also were
responsible for the benefit to the class. That case involved a class action challenging the adequacy of
the consideration to be received in a stock-for-stock merger of Compass International Services
Corporation into NCO Group, Inc. The parties initially agreed to a settlement that created a
downside "collar" under which additional NCO shares worth $1.2 million would be issued if the
price of NCO stock dropped below $29.50. Compass's earnings and revenues subsequently
declined, and the price of NCO stock increased.
NCO advised Compass that it would
consummate the merger only if the value of the stock to be issued was reduced by $5 million.
The parties then revised the settlement to provide that the entire $5 million price reduction
would be borne by management shareholders of Compass, by reducing number of NCO shares to
be issued to them. This generated a benefit worth $2.9 million to public shareholders. The
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of these cases, too, the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee requests were consistent
with their claim of sole credit, in that the fees requested represented a
substantially higher percentage of the amounts recovered than did the
fees requested by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys where the latter's
litigation efforts were purported to be only partially responsible for
whatever financial benefit was realized by the plaintiff class. Finally, in
none of these three cases did the substantial plaintiffs attorneys
attempt to negotiate a fee award payable by defendants. Rather, in all
three the plaintiffs' attorneys sought judicial approval of fees payable
from the common fund that their efforts had created. This contrasts
sharply with the fee arrangements negotiated by "traditional" plaintiffs'
attorneys, which, in all of the cases that we studied, involved
agreements by defendants to pay (up to some agreed upon limit)
whatever attorneys' fees the court awarded.
F. The Delaware Courts'Monitoringof Merger-Related Class Actions
Finally, we considered what the data that we had gathered
suggested about whether the Delaware Chancery Court was
effectively monitoring merger-related class actions to ensure that
plaintiffs' attorneys were not exploiting their "license to litigate"
primarily to enrich themselves. We did not give a great deal of weight
to one datum-that all of the settlements negotiated by plaintiffs'
attorneys received judicial approval--because courts in general are
notoriously reluctant to disapprove negotiated settlements of complex
corporate litigation. 146 Nonetheless, the Chancery Court's 100 percent
approval rate clearly provides no support for claims that the Court is
acting as an effective monitor or is alert to the possibility of
147
collusion.
original settlement provided that plaintiffs would move for an award of fees and expenses of
$250,000, which defendants reserved the right to oppose. Defendants indicated that effort by
plaintiffs' attorneys to increase their fee after the settlement was revised would put the entire
agreement at risk. Plaintiffs elected not to ask for increased fee, and defendants elected not to
oppose their $250,000 fee request.
146. A number of factors impair the effectiveness of courts' review. Perhaps the most
important is that settlement hearings rarely are adversarial. As Judge Henry Friendly pointed
out many years ago: "[o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders
link arms with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork." Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd per curiam, 340 F.2d 311
(2d Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966). Similarly, Professors Macey and
Miller describe settlement hearings as "pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and
defense counsel." Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 46.
147. We have no basis to believe that any of the settlements we reviewed were explicitly
collusive. However, the potential for tacitly collusive settlements exists, especially in cases
involving squeeze outs and MBOs in which an SNC has invited plaintiffs' attorneys to
participate in its deliberations. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. It also is in those
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We found the reluctance of the Chancery Court to involve itself
in the process by which lead counsel is appointed to be somewhat more
troubling. We found that when multiple class-action complaints were
filed, the court allowed (or encouraged) the plaintiffs' attorneys who
filed complaints to resolve the lead counsel issue through private
negotiations. This finding was consistent with the description that
Franklin Balotti, an experienced Delaware practitioner, recently
provided to the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class
Counsel. 148 Indeed, as Mr. Balotti pointed out, "on the few occasions
when Delaware courts have had to confront organizational disputes
among plaintiffs' counsel, they have repeatedly admonished counsel to
organize themselves.' 4 9
The plaintiffs' bar has responded to these admonishments by
adopting a simple decision rule to determine which attorney or law
firm should be appointed lead counsel: a presumption that the
attorney or law firm who filed the first class-action complaint should
be named lead or co-lead counsel. 150 Thus, the Chancery Court's
hands-off approach has had the unfortunate effect of promoting the
"race to the courthouse" evidenced by our finding that the first
complaints in the vast majority of merger-related cases were filed
within one day after the challenged mergers were announced.

mergers that the "independent" directors who serve on SNCs are most likely to have divided
loyalties. Allen, supra note 75, at 2057. Further, as is discussed in the text below, attorneys for
both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases are repeat players. It is a well understood
proposition in game theory that players who are involved in repeated plays of the same game (so
long as there is no specified end point) are more likely to achieve tacitly collusive outcomes than
are players in one-shot games. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS CH. 13 (5th ed. 2001).
148. Written Statement of R. Franklin Balotti, Testimony Before the Task Force on Selection
of Class Counsel, 1, at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness%20Statements/
balotti.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
149. Id.
In TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc.,
Chancellor Chandler confirms that the court's custom is to encourage counsel in class and
derivative actions to reach agreement as to how and by whom an action should be prosecuted.
C.A. Nos. 18336, 18289, 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000). He notes with
apparent regret that "[o]ver the past ten years, members of the Court of Chancery have been
asked, with increasing frequency, to become involved in the sometimes unseemly internecine
struggles within the plaintiffs' bar over the power to control, direct and (one suspects) ultimately
settle shareholder lawsuits filed in this jurisdiction." Id. at *3.
150. Members of the plaintiffs' bar have informally confirmed to us that this is the decision
rule most frequently used. See also Balotti, supra note 148, at 5-7 (commenting that this
approach has some support in Delaware precedent). We found only one case, In re IBP, Inc.
S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18373 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 2003), in which members of the traditional
plaintiffs' bar sought judicial intervention because they were unable to resolve the lead counsel
issue through private negotiation. The other cases in which the court got involved in that issue
all involved law firms representing "real" clients. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying
text.
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Moreover, the court appears insensitive to the link between the
approach that it has adopted and its expression of concern that "[t]oo
often judges of this Court face complaints filed hastily, minutes or
hours after a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the
print or electronic media. Such pleadings are remarkable, but only
because of the speed with which they are filed in reaction to an
announced transaction." 151
The findings to which we attach the most significance, though,
are those relating to fee awards because we believe that the Chancery
Court's authority to award attorney fees provides it with potentially
its most effective mechanism to regulate the conduct of the plaintiffs'
bar. 15 2 We found forty-seven cases in which the Chancery Court
passed on fee requests from "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys. 153 In
forty of these, or 85 percent, the court awarded all fees requested. Two
prior studies of Delaware Chancery Court litigation, one covering
ninety-eight settlements of class and derivative actions reviewed
between 1990 and 1992154 and another covering 138 settlements
reviewed between January 1, 1998, and April 15, 2001,155 suggest that
this is somewhat above the norm. Both of those studies found that all
fees requested were approved in only two-thirds of the cases studied.
Moreover, the absence of a demand requirement, which makes it
considerably more likely that a class action will be filed and settled
primarily because of its nuisance value, makes the higher rate of full
156
approvals in merger-related class actions even more surprising.

151. TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3. Given the court's announced
preference for a hands-off approach, its statement that neither Delaware law nor custom support
the belief that the first to file deserves a preference, see id., seems largely irrelevant.
152. As Chancellor Chandler explained in Fuqua, Delaware courts use the promise of fee
awards as an incentive to encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to enforce the duties of corporate
fiduciaries, recognize that this may lead plaintiffs' attorneys to act out of self-interest rather
than in shareholders' interests, and should use their power over fee awards to penalize or
minimize self-interested behavior. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (citing In re Fuqua
Indus., Inc. S'holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 133-35 (Del. Ch. 1999).
153. We counted IXC Communications (Crawford v. Bell (In re IXC Communications, Inc.
S'holders Litig.), C.A. Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999)) in this category
because the fee request there was made jointly by traditional plaintiffs' attorneys, as lead
counsel for the class, and the law firm that represented Mr. Crawford. See supra note 143.
154. Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlement Fever: How a Delaware Court Tackles Its
Cases, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 7.
155. William B. Chandler III, Awarding Counsel Fees in Class and Derivative Litigation in
the Delaware Court of Chancery, Presentation to the Conference on the Role of Judges in
Corporate and Securities Law at University of Michigan Law School (Apr. 20, 2001), at
www.law.umich.edu/CentersAndPrograms/olin/Confpapers/2001/Chandler.pdf.
156. On the other hand, derivative suits may be more likely to settle for non-monetary relief
of questionable value. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation,7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991).
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The specifics of the cases in which objections were filed and
fees were reduced further suggest lax judicial oversight of the manner
in which plaintiffs' attorneys litigated merger-related class actions.
Table 10 lists the cases in which fees were reduced, the judge involved,
whether an objection was made to the fee request of plaintiffs'
attorneys, 157 and the percentage by which the court reduced the fees
requested.158 There were only two cases in which objections were filed.
Both involved somewhat serendipitous circumstances. In Banctec, an
objection was filed by Professor Weiss's colleague, 159 and in Donna
Karan International, one was filed by a class member that initially
was a named plaintiff in that action and that frequently has been a
named plaintiff in corporate litigation,1 60 but that apparently had a
falling out with the plaintiffs' law firm with which it had been
aligned.161
One could view the small number of objections as evidence that
shareholders in general are satisfied with the efforts of plaintiffs'
attorneys, but we do not construe it in that fashion. 16 2 As noted above,
every case settled by a "traditional" plaintiffs' attorney involved a
provision in the Stipulation of Settlement to the effect that attorney
fees (up to some agreed upon amount) would be paid by defendants,
rather than from a common fund or by members of the plaintiff class.
By allowing settlements to be so structured, the Chancery Court has
reduced considerably the likelihood that objections will be filed.
Defendants in all such cases had committed themselves not to object

157. We counted only objections supported by briefs, not letters sent by class members
expressing general concern about or disagreement with proposed fee awards.
158. The court also reduced the requested fees in two cases in which the class was
represented by attorneys representing a substantial shareholder. In Telecorp PCS, the attorneys
requested $14.25 million in fees, plus reimbursement of expenses of approximately $350,000.
The court awarded $14.25 million for fees and expenses combined, a reduction of about 2 percent.
In Digex, as discussed supra note 144, the SNC disputed the attorneys' claim that they were
solely responsible for the settlement and also challenged the amount of fees requested. The court
awarded 50 percent of the fees requested.
159. See supra note 17.
160. Harbor Finance Partners was the class member that filed the objection in Donna Karan
International. Notice of Intention to Appear & Object (Harbor Finance Partners, Ltd.), In re
Donna Karan Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18559 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2002). See Thompson
& Thomas, supra note 14, at 188 (noting that Harbor Finance Partners served most frequently
as a named plaintiff in the cases that they studied).
161. See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of the Proposed Settlement and Application for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, at 29-31, In re Donna Karan Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
18559, (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2002).
162. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.
2004) (finding that objections are infrequent and questioning whether courts should attach much
weight to the absence of objections).
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to plaintiffs' attorneys' fee requests. 163 And members of the plaintiff
class had no financial incentive to object, since the fees were not
coming directly out of their pockets--as would have been the case had
those fees been payable from a common fund. 164 Consequently, the
Chancery Court's tolerance of this settlement structure itself
suggested to us that the court had little interest in encouraging class
members to scrutinize closely the fee awards requested by their selfappointed champions.
Even more striking, though, were the court's reactions to the
arguments advanced by the two objectors. In Banctec, the objector
argued that no fee should be awarded primarily because plaintiffs had
filed a suit for which they had no factual basis, had found no evidence
to support their claims, and had then negotiated a settlement calling
for supplemental disclosures that provided members of the plaintiff
class with information of no significance. 165 In Donna Karan
1 66
International,
the objector argued that the suit had been filed
prematurely because plaintiffs' attorneys should have waited to see if
the board of Donna Karan International (DKI) accepted the
challenged buy-out offer; that DKI was not controlled by persons
affiliated with the offeror because another shareholder group owned
almost as many shares; that the increase in price was attributable
almost entirely to the efforts of DKI's SNC and the other large
shareholder group; that the number of hours claimed by plaintiffs'
attorneys was excessive given the limited litigation activity they had
undertaken; and that most work claimed by plaintiffs' attorneys was
167
done by partners even though it was routine.
The court appeared to credit both objectors' arguments, in that
it reduced plaintiffs' attorneys' fee request by 90 percent in Banctec
and by 78 percent in DKI. 168 Yet arguments identical or similar to
those made by objectors in Banctec and DKI, in our view, could be

163. We did find two cases in which defendants initially indicated that they intended to
object to the size of plaintiffs' fee request. In both, plaintiffs' attorneys then agreed to reduce the
size of their fee requests in exchange for defendants' agreement not to object.
164. In contrast, all three settlements negotiated by attorneys representing "real" clients
called for payment of fees from the common funds created by their efforts.
165. Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application for Award of Attorneys' Fees, In re
Banctec, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 17092 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2000).
166. In re Donna Karan Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18559 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2002).
167. See Plaintiff Harbor Finance's Reply to Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Their Petition for
Fees and Expenses, at 1-6, In re Donna Karan International Inc. Shareholders' Litig., C.A. 18559
(Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2002).
168. As noted above, Professor Weiss's objection in Calmat, a merger not included in our
study, resulted in a sharp (67 percent) reduction in the fees requested by plaintiffs' attorneys
there. See supra note 19.
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made with comparable force with respect to a substantial majority of
the class-action settlements that we examined. However, where no
objector appeared to make them, the Chancery Court rarely took the
initiative. In only one other case, IBP, did the court reduce the
requested attorneys' fees by more than 50 percent, and there the
benefit for which plaintiffs' attorneys claimed credit was, in a sense,
antithetical to the theory on the basis on which those class actions
initially had been filed. 169 In only four other cases were fees reduced at
all, and in all but one of those, the reductions were made by the same
Vice-Chancellor. 17 0 In 89 percent of the cases in which no objection
was filed, the court awarded to plaintiffs' attorneys all of the fees that
they requested.
The Chancery Court appears to base its hands-off approach on
the fact that Delaware practice calls for plaintiffs' attorneys to refrain
from discussing fees with defendants until after the substantive terms
of a settlement have been agreed upon and that defendants
consequently have "a 100 percent direct dollar-for-dollar interest in
getting the lowest fee [they can]. '"171 This reasoning, it seems to us,
reflects a naive or simplistic view of the dynamics of the settlement
process.1 72 Attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases
almost always are repeat players. As such, they know at the time that
they negotiate a MOU setting forth the terms of a proposed classaction settlement that the attorney fee issue ultimately will have to be
addressed.173 They also know that if the proposed merger closes before
confirmatory discovery is completed and the formal Stipulation of
Settlement is signed-which typically is the case-plaintiffs' attorneys
almost certainly will expect defendants to pay whatever fees

169. Plaintiffs initially challenged the fairness of a proposed MBO. A bidding contest
thereafter developed, and IBP agreed tc- be acquired by Tyson Foods, Inc. Plaintiffs then
amended their complaint to challenge the fairness of that merger. Before that suit could be
resolved, Tyson attempted to back out of its agreement with IBP. IBP, supported by plaintiffs,
responded by bringing suit to enforce its agreement with Tyson. It was the court's decision that
this agreement was specifically enforceable in that it served as the basis for plaintiffs' attorneys'
request for a fee award. Maureen Milford, New York Firm Scolded for Filing Shareholder Suits,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 20, 2001, at A21.
170. Our sample may be atypical in this respect. Chandler, supra note 155, at 76-77 exh. A,
found that decisions reducing fee requests were made by all members of the Chancery Court.
171. Ruling Following Settlement Hearing, at 7, In re Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp. S'holders
Litig., C.A. No. 17902 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000).
172. In making this statement, we are not suggesting that plaintiffs' attorneys, contrary to
the representations that they customarily make to the court, explicitly discuss proposed fee
awards with defendants prior to reaching final agreement on a settlement's substantive terms.
173. Moreover, the attorneys also know that if they surprise the opposing attorneys in any
given case, their actions are likely to make it more difficult for them to negotiate settlements in
future cases.
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subsequently are awarded. 174 Moreover, as an economic matter, we
find it hard to believe that defendants in these cases do not have some
"bottom line" on the total amount that they are prepared to pay, to the
plaintiff class and/or to plaintiffs' attorneys, in order to consummate
a proposed merger. Thus, we suspect, some "shadow negotiation" of
fee awards inevitably occurs. The vehicle for this negotiation may well
be the conversation in which attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants
discuss the wording of the clause in the standard MOU in which
defendants acknowledge the extent to which plaintiffs' attorneys'
efforts have contributed to whatever benefit the class is purported to
have realized.175
At a minimum, an examination of the settlements we studied,
of the Chancery Court's decisions in the two cases in which objections
were filed, and of that court's decisions in the much larger number of
cases in which no objection was filed, suggests to us that the court did
not use its power to control fee awards to monitor effectively the
litigation efforts of the plaintiffs' bar. Why, for example, was the court
prepared to reduce dramatically the attorneys' fees requested in
Banctec and Donna Karan International,but not equally prepared to
make similar cuts in the fees requested in the far larger number of
cases in which similar objections could be made but no objector
appeared? That the defendants in those other cases were prepared to
pay the fees requested does not strike us as a persuasive response, for
the reasons outlined above.17 6 What the court should have
appreciated, we believe, is that defendants' willingness to pay
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees may well have represented either a strategic
concession that so proceeding was either the least costly means of
disposing of a lawsuit that lacked merit but had nuisance value or an
implicit payoff to the plaintiffs' attorneys in exchange for their
acquiescence in the terms negotiated by an SNC. By approving those
fee arrangements-which usually provided plaintiffs' attorneys with
very high hourly compensation177-the Court effectively encouraged

174. Not only is this the customary practice, but the only alternative would be to ask that
fees be assessed against and collected from the members of the plaintiff class.
175. For example, discussions might focus on whether defendants are prepared to say that
an SNC was aware of the pendency of plaintiffs' claims, that the SNC took account of plaintiffs'
arguments or that plaintiffs' efforts contributed to whatever increase in price the SNC
negotiated. The stronger is defendants' acknowledgment of plaintiffs' "contribution," the stronger
will be plaintiffs' attorneys' claim for a substantial fee award.
176. One also might ask: If it was appropriate for the Court to rely on defendants' judgments
in those cases, then why did the Court not rely on defendants' judgments in the two cases where
objections were filed?
177. This is especially so if one considers two additional factors. First, upwards of 40 percent
of the hours that plaintiffs' attorneys devote to these cases generally are expended after a MOU
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plaintiffs' attorneys to continue litigating merger-related class actions
in a manner that, by
and large, appears to advance only the interests
7
of those attorneys.1 8
G. An Assessment
We began this Part by laying out two alternative hypotheses as
to what drives shareholder litigation, especially with respect to mergerrelated class actions in the Delaware courts: the shareholder champion
hypothesis and the self-interested litigator hypothesis. We believe that
the evidence presented in Sections B-F, taken as a whole, strongly
supports the self-interested litigator hypothesis.
In Section B we provided an analysis of which mergers tend to be
challenged by class-action shareholder lawsuits.
We found that
important influences on the likelihood that plaintiffs' attorneys would
challenge a merger were the size of the transaction, the (inverse of the)
size of the initial premium offered to the target company's shareholders,
the presence of an all-cash deal (representing a sale of control), and the
presence of an acquiror with a significant prior stake in the target or
other appearances of conflict of interest. Though these influences could
be interpreted as consistent with either hypothesis, the overall
conclusion nevertheless is that this particular type of litigation is
systematic and purposive and not the result of random decisions on the
part of plaintiffs or their attorneys.
The tendency of mergers to be challenged where the acquiror had
a prior stake or there were other conflicts poses an especially interesting
and subtle problem of interpretation. It may be the case that there are
continuing abuses in these kinds of transactions (although it is unclear
why the prospects of costly litigation have not deterred them). But
another possibility should be considered. Could it be that, given the

is signed, and thus involve virtually no contingency risk. Second, at least some of plaintiffs'
attorneys' claims of hours worked appear inflated. In Feldman v. Shaw (In re Sodexho Marriott
Shareholders Litigation), C.A. No. 18640 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002), for example, the three firms
that were appointed as co-lead counsel claimed that they had spent a total of 70.8 hours on legal
research and preparing pleadings, even though their complaints all were filed within two days
after that proposed squeeze out was announced, were virtually identical, and involved virtually
identical allegations that were quite similar to allegations that the same law firms had made in
many similar cases.
178. Late in the editing process, the authors were able to obtain a transcript of the
settlement hearing in Donna Karan Internationa--a document not available from public
sources. They found that at that hearing the Court had expressed misgivings about routinely
granting requests for attorneys' fees that defendants had agreed to pay, largely because of
concerns about the incentive effects of such fee awards. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing 7477, In re Donna Karan Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 18559 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2002). Thus,
the Court's ruling foreshadowed many of the arguments made herein.
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structure of Delaware law that we described in Part II, an acquiror's
prior stake in the target (or an acquiror's arrangements to continue to
employ and reward the incumbent management), and the possibility of
insider abuses that are thereby raised, often presents too tempting a
target for plaintiffs' attorneys? If this is so, and especially if an SNC has
not yet had a chance to consider the acquiror's offer at the time that the
offer is made public, then an acquiror with a prior stake may simply
have to face the likelihood that a class-action lawsuit will be filed,
regardless of the price that the acquiror initially offers to the other
stockholders. This prospect would surely reinforce the bargaining
instincts that in any event might lead an acquiror initially to make a
"lowball" offer, which it then would be prepared to increase in
subsequent negotiations with the SNC. Although such lowballing would
increase the probability that a class action will be filed following the
announcement of a squeeze out or an MBO, thus generating an
unfortunate equilibrium of lawsuits' being filed whenever acquirors have
prior stakes in their targets, it also might present acquirors with
opportunities to insulate such mergers from scrutiny by arranging
advantageous settlements with the plaintiffs' bar. 179 The creation of this
kind of equilibrium would be most consistent with the self-interested
litigator hypothesis.
We next turned in Section C to an overview description of the 104
mergers that were challenged and the characteristics of the litigation.
An initial complaint was filed within the first two days after the merger
announcement in over 80 percent of the merger challenges. Multiple
complaints were filed in most cases. This pattern of early and frequent
filings is one that is consistent with opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs'
attorneys-specifically, the self-interested litigator hypothesis.
Settlements occurred in slightly less than 50 percent of the cases
that have been resolved. No cases were litigated to a judgment on the
merits in favor of the plaintiffs. Of the cases that were dismissed, over
90 percent were dropped before there were any judicial decisions that
addressed the merits of the lawsuit, and very few of these voluntary
dismissals involved significant litigation efforts by plaintiffs' attorneys.
Where the settlements involved claimed monetary recoveries, the
plaintiffs' attorneys most often appeared to have free ridden on the
decisions of SNCs or on improved terms offered by a competing bidder,
rarely claimed full credit for the purported recovery, and never persisted

179. An acquiror would know that few cases are actually litigated to a judgment on the merits
and that the costs of delay for most mergers are high, perhaps including the unraveling of the
transaction. If an acquiror can settle such a suit for a comparatively modest sum, it may find that
prospect attractive, especially if doing so will allow the transaction to proceed to completion.
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in challenging improved terms negotiated by an SNC (or the terms
proposed by a competing bidder). Further, in settled cases, although
plaintiffs' attorneys' requests for fees tended to be a low percentage of
the claimed recoveries1 80 (arguably an admission by the attorneys that
they contributed little to the recoveries), they generally represented rich
rewards when measured on an hourly basis. Plaintiffs' attorneys also
tended to do well even when settlements did not involve any monetary
recovery. Since settlements occurred in slightly less than half of the
lawsuits filed, and since the hours and efforts devoted to the lawsuits
that were dismissed generally were very modest, the overall returns to
plaintiffs' attorneys from filing merger-related class actions appear to be
attractive. Again, this pattern is consistent with opportunistic behavior
by plaintiffs' attorneys.
The fact that the aggregate legal fees in settled cases tend to be a
relatively low percentage of claimed monetary recoveries has two
potential interpretations, the second of which adds to our sense of
unease about this process. On the one hand, lower fees could be
evidence of the efficiency (low relative transactions costs) and the
modest aspirations of the plaintiffs' bar (and the reason why Delaware
courts only infrequently award less than all fees requested). On the
other hand, they can be seen as a practical admission that plaintiffs'
attorneys' efforts contributed little to the improved terms in these
transactions and that plaintiffs' attorneys were largely free riding on
improvements that would have occurred anyway. We find the second
interpretation more persuasive.
We next provided in Section D a summary of our detailed
examination of all 104 challenged mergers and the accompanying
litigation against the backdrop of the type of merger. This analysis
again supports a picture of free riding with little "value added" by
plaintiffs' attorneys in most cases, again supporting the self-interested
litigator hypothesis.
We recognize that our analysis in Section D does not answer
definitively one key question: whether the class actions that we
studied and, in particular, the cases involving improvements in the
terms of squeeze outs and MBOs, either (a) actually produced
improvements in the terms of mergers; (b) involved no more than free
riding by plaintiffs' attorneys; or (c) often involved tacitly collusive
settlements in which plaintiffs' attorneys dropped their objections to

180. They are relatively low in the sense that a frequent percentage figure in plaintiff
contingency cases is 33 percent and sizeable legal fees are frequently earned by plaintiffs'
attorneys in successful antitrust treble damages cases as well as in the recent tobacco litigation
cases.
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arguably unfair mergers in exchange for defendants' implicit
assurances that they would finance relatively generous attorney fee
awards.1 81 It may be, as members of the plaintiffs' bar have argued to
us, that plaintiffs' attorneys are so committed to vigorous advocacy of
shareholders' interests that the incentives provided by Delaware law,
even if perverse, are not sufficient to cause them to deviate from that
commitment. However, we remain skeptical that such is the case. Our
other findings (and economic theory) all suggest it is far more likely
that plaintiffs' attorneys are motivated primarily by self-interest and
that their litigation efforts, shaped as they are by the incentives
provided by Delaware law, produce little in the way of meaningful
benefits for the shareholders that those attorneys purport to
represent.
In Section E we contrasted five cases, where "real" plaintiffs with
substantial stakes were represented by attorneys who were outside the
"traditional" plaintiffs' bar, with the remaining ninety-nine cases that
were prosecuted by the traditional bar. In those five cases, litigation
was more substantial; in three, the plaintiffs. achieved significant
monetary recoveries; and, reflecting the significant roles that they
played, plaintiffs' attorneys in those three settlements received fees that
were a higher fraction of the recoveries than was the norm and that
were paid out of a common fund rather than directly by defendants (as
was the norm in cases settled by "traditional" plaintiffs' attorneys). This
sharply different litigation pattern for these five cases suggests to us
that the norm for the other ninety-nine is better explained by the selfinterested litigator hypothesis.
Finally, in Section F we examined the Delaware courts' reviews
of settlements and of attorney fee awards. We found that no settlements
were overturned by the courts, and that in 85 percent of the settled
cases the courts approved the fee requests from the "traditional"
plaintiffs' attorneys; further, the fees are almost always paid by
defendants rather than out of a common fund, so that members of the
plaintiff class have little basis for objecting. We argue that this record of
relatively lax review is likely to encourage a pattern of litigation driven
by the self-interested litigator hypothesis.
In sum, the pattern that we observe in the class-action
shareholder lawsuits that were filed against merger targets in
181. No definitive answer is possible bdcause it is not possible to determine on what terms,
in a world of perfect information, these class actions would have been resolved. The question is
important, though, both because these cases account for a majority of the monetary settlements
negotiated by the plaintiffs' bar and because it was settlements such as these that led Thompson
and Thomas to conclude that shareholder class actions "deserved a seat at the table of corporate
governance." See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Delaware courts is redolent of a pattern of opportunistic filings, of a
lawyer-driven process rather than a true client-driven process:
"

systematic behavior with respect to which mergers were
challenged;

"

early and frequent complaints filed;

*

a very high percentage of dismissed cases never reached
a judgment on the merits;

*

the absence of a single case that has been decided in
favor of the plaintiffs on the merits;

"

settlements tending to reflect free riding by plaintiffs'
attorneys;

"

plaintiffs' attorneys failing to persist in challenges to
SNCs' decisions or to competing offers;

"

attorneys with "real" clients and from outside the
"traditional" Delaware plaintiffs' bar were far more
vigorous in their litigation efforts on behalf of their
clients;

*

no settlements overturned by the Delaware courts;

"

plaintiffs' attorneys' fee awards in settlements usually
paid by defendants and not out of common funds, and
largely unchallenged; and

"

plaintiffs' attorneys' fees representing a strikingly low
percentage of claimed recoveries (even though they are
attractive on an hourly basis), which may well indicate
that the attorneys added little value to the recoveries.

In sum, it is a pattern that is far more consistent with the selfinterested litigator hypothesis than with the shareholder champion
hypothesis. We find this picture quite troubling, as it suggests that
merger-related class actions primarily serve as a vehicle through which
the plaintiffs' bar (and to some extent the defense bar) are able to
extract rents from the shareholders of Delaware corporations.
IV. CONCLUSION

We began by hypothesizing that Delaware law provides
plaintiffs' attorneys with substantial incentives to initiate, prosecute
and settle merger-related class actions in a manner that advances
their own economic interests rather than those of the shareholders
they purport to represent. Our analysis of relevant economic and
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litigation-related data strongly suggests that the plaintiffs' bar, at
least with respect to mergers announced in 1999 through 2001,
responded to these incentives in a predictably self-interested fashion.
We found those results troubling, especially since the litigation
environment in Delaware today is largely the same as it was during
the years that we studied.
Merger-related class actions have become the dominant form of
shareholder litigation in Delaware. If such actions continue to serve
primarily as devices that enrich plaintiffs' attorneys while providing
shareholders with little in the way of meaningful benefits, they will
undermine an important pillar of Delaware's system of corporate
governance. As Professor James Cox has observed:
Much like the shepherd who cries wolf too frequently, shareholder suits, if commonly
understood to be frivolous, will not in their commencement, prosecution and settlement
affirm the social norms the suit's defendants allegedly violated. Their defendants will
instead be seen as the objects of bad luck not derision. Thus, the procedural context in
which corporate and securities norms are developed 1 82
and affirmed are of the utmost
significance if those norms are to discipline managers.

We are confident that Delaware's courts did not deliberately
set out to construct a litigation environment with such a strong
propensity to generate agency costs. Rather, the current,
unsatisfactory situation appears to have evolved largely as a
consequence of the interaction between Delaware's existing system of
privatized enforcement and a series of recent decisions that address,
seriatim, a variety of difficult substantive problems relating to
mergers, takeovers, and takeover defenses. Nonetheless, given the
unfortunate impact that those substantive decisions appear to have
had on merger-related class-action litigation, some remedial action by
Delaware's courts appears to be in order.
Specifying the remedial actions the courts should take,
however, poses a ticklish problem. Corporate governance and
corporate litigation involve dynamic processes. How they will be
affected by any given change in the law often is hard to predict and, as
data in this paper make clear, well-meaning changes often produce
unintended (and unfortunate) consequences.18 3 Consequently, we set
forth our suggestions for change with a strong sense of modesty. We
182. James D. Cox, 'The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits," 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 6
(1999).
183. For example, Lynch I may have adopted a rule to the effect that approval of a squeeze
out by an SNC will shift to plaintiff the burden of proving that the squeeze out is unfair, at least
in part, so as to encourage use of truly independent SNCs. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994). But that rule appears to have had the effect of
encouraging plaintiffs' attorneys to settle cases challenging squeeze outs, largely without regard
to whether the merger terms agreed to by an SNC are entirely fair.
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recognize that, as academics, we may not be sufficiently sensitive to
practical problems that those changes may produce for the courts or to
how either plaintiffs' or defense attorneys are likely to react if the
changes that we propose are implemented.184
Our first suggestion relates to the process by which lead
plaintiff and lead counsel are appointed. Given the time pressures
that surround most merger-related class actions, we do not believe it
feasible for Delaware courts to implement procedures similar to those
used by federal courts to appoint lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in
securities class actions. However, we believe it would be both feasible
and desirable for the Chancery Court to signal that it is not
necessarily antagonistic to efforts to involve it in the lead plaintiffflead
counsel appointment process, so as to encourage institutional
investors and other substantial shareholders to become more actively
18 5
involved in merger-related class actions.
Absent judicial intervention, the "traditional" plaintiffs' bar is
highly unlikely to relinquish voluntarily to attorneys representing
"real" clients1 8 6 the control it currently exercises over most mergerrelated class actions. Moreover, if the Chancery Court continues to
signal to institutional investors that it usually will react with
annoyance to efforts on their part to enlist its help in obtaining control
of merger-related class actions, institutions are likely to decide that it
doesn't pay even to make such efforts. To avoid this outcome, when
future cases arise in which institutional investors seek to become lead
plaintiffs and to have their attorneys appointed lead counsel, the court
should clarify that whatever antagonism it has expressed toward
efforts to involve it at this stage of litigation pertains only to
184. We recognize that one probable impact of our proposals would be to reduce the number
of merger-related class actions filed and prosecuted in Delaware Chancery Court. Professors
Macey and Miller have set forth a public choice theory of corporate law that suggests that
Delaware courts have an interest in promoting a fairly high level of corporate litigation, so as to
generate income for Delaware attorneys and, indirectly, for the State of Delaware. Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 469-73 (1987). We have no reason to believe that such considerations lie
behind the Delaware courts' relatively lax approach to monitoring class-action settlements and
attorney fee requests. However, if they do, there would appear to be little prospect that Delaware
courts will respond favorably to our proposals.
185. Given the outcomes of the suits described in Part IV.E, we believe that increased
involvement by institutional and other substantial investors is apt to be beneficial to
shareholders generally.
186. We note that some of the firms that we have identified as part of the traditional
plaintiffs' bar also regularly represent institutional investors in securities class actions. It seems
reasonable to anticipate that, were the Chancery Court to signal its receptivity to appointing
institutional investors as lead plaintiffs, many of those firms would redirect their efforts from
racing to the courthouse to encouraging "real" clients with substantial financial stakes to become
involved more frequently in merger-related class actions.
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internecine spats within the plaintiffs' bar-that it does not extend to
efforts by attorneys with "real" clients, proceeding on the basis of wellresearched pleadings, to gain control of class actions from plaintiffs'
attorneys whose claims to control are based largely on the fact that
they were the first to file a class-action complaint.
Our second suggestion concerns pleading standards. In their
most recent paper, Professors Thompson and Thomas conclude that
derivative suits, when filed on behalf of shareholders of public
corporations, generate relatively few litigation-related agency costs, in
large part because the demand requirement and the possibility of
special litigation committee review discourage
opportunistic
litigation.1 8 7 As we point out above, Delaware law imposes no
comparable constraints on merger-related class actions, and, in part
as a consequence, opportunistic class-action litigation appears to be
common. Class-action complaints frequently are filed for strictly
tactical reasons--almost half of the complaints we studied were
dismissed voluntarily without the attorneys who filed them
undertaking any significant additional litigation efforts-and very few
of the remaining complaints ultimately lead to the realization of
significant benefits by the shareholders on whose behalf they
ostensibly are filed.
The Delaware Supreme Court may have sound reasons to
continue to impose on corporate directors and controlling shareholders
the burden of proving, with respect to a variety of merger-related
decisions, that they proceeded in conformity with the relevant
standard of review. But, it seems to us, so assigning the burden of
proof does not necessarily require the court to rule, as it did in
Krasner v. Moffett, that a bare bones complaint18 8 should not be
dismissed. 8 9 Rather, we believe that in cases where defendants have
the burden of proof, the court nonetheless should dismiss class-action
complaints unless plaintiffs plead particularized facts that, if true,
would create a reasonable doubt that defendants failed to satisfy (or
are reasonably likely not to satisfy) the relevant standard of review. 190
In addition, the court should consider further discouraging the filing of
187. See Robert B Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.
2004).
188. One that alleges no more than that such a decision was made (or will be made) and that
the directors or controlling shareholder who made it (or will make it) breached the relevant
standard of review.
189. Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 287 (Del. 2003).
190. We believe that the court should adopt a pleading standard somewhat more rigorous
than that set by Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but somewhat less rigorous than
that set by § 21(d)(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2004)).
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frivolous or entirely speculative class-action complaints by
encouraging imposition of sanctions on attorneys whose complaints
clearly fall short of this standard or on attorneys who file complaints
that they then seek to dismiss voluntarily without making any
significant efforts to prosecute the claims advanced therein.191
Finally, and most importantly, Delaware courts should begin to
review far more rigorously requests for attorney fee awards. It is the
prospect of fee awards, Delaware courts have acknowledged, that
motivates the plaintiffs' bar. Now those courts must recognize that it
is essential that they use their power over fee awards to motivate the
plaintiffs' bar to reshape its class-action litigation efforts.
In Parts II and III of this paper we lay bare-convincingly, we
believe-the litigation dynamics that appear to underlie the vast
majority of settlements of merger-related class actions. Most monetary
settlements appear to involve free riding at best and tacit collusion at
worst. All but a few nonmonetary settlements appear to result from
plaintiffs' attorneys' ability to threaten to impose litigation costs on
defendants. Yet Delaware courts, by and large, appear to have ignored
the litigation dynamics that gave rise to these settlements. Instead, in
case after case, those courts have tended to rubber-stamp whatever fee
requests were made by plaintiffs' attorneys, so long as defendants did
not object.1 92 By so proceeding, those courts have failed to fulfill the
monitoring role that their judicially-created system of privatized
enforcement assumes they will play.
At least two changes seem to us to be essential. First, the
Delaware Supreme Court should reconsider its decisions in
Tandycrafts and United Vanguard Fund. The presumption that they
create-that any benefits realized by the plaintiff class after a class
action has been filed were caused, at least in part, by the litigation
efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys-appears to us to be counter-factual,
especially as it applies to cases in which plaintiffs' attorneys have an
opportunity to free ride on the efforts of others. In addition, that
presumption and the related burden of proof' 93 increase dramatically
plaintiffs' attorneys' leverage when bargaining for an attorneys' fee

191. Adopting such an approach to pleading standards and sanctions also should have a
salutary, secondary effect: slowing the race to the courthouse.
192. This proposition holds true, with the exception of the two cases in which objectors
serendipitously appeared and urged the courts to take account of the impact of the relevant
litigation dynamics.
193. Defendants can rebut the presumption only by proving that the class action "did not in
any way cause their [subsequent] action." United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693
A.2d 1076, 1080 (Del. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron,
413 A.2d 876, 880 (Del. 1980)).
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award in cases in which they can free ride on the efforts of others and,
as such, also may promote settlements that are tacitly collusive.
Perhaps most importantly, they limit dramatically the Chancery
Court's ability to deny fees in such cases.
The best solution would be for the Supreme Court to eliminate
the presumption in favor of a fee award whenever the class realizes
some postfiling benefit. 194 At a minimum, the Court should emphasize
that its holdings in Tandycrafts and United Vanguard Fund are
subject to its prior holding in Chrysler Corporation v. Dann to the
effect that before a plaintiffs' attorney is entitled to a fee award, she
must demonstrate that at the time she filed her complaint, she
"possesse[d] knowledge of provable facts which h[e]ld out some
reasonable likelihood
of
ultimate
success."19 5
In
many
cases-particularly those in which the initial complaint was filed
before the terms of a squeeze out or MBO have been finalized-strict
enforcement of this standard will reduce considerably the ability of
plaintiffs' attorneys to demand unjustified fee awards.
Second, when it reviews settlements and requests for attorneys'
fees, the Chancery Court should take account of the litigation
dynamics described above. Where plaintiffs' attorneys appear largely
to have free ridden on the efforts of others or to have succeeded
primarily because they were able to threaten to impose unnecessary
litigation costs on defendants, any fee awards should be
parsimonious. 196
So changing the manner in which the Chancery Court reviews
settlements and fee requests no doubt initially would add to its
already heavy workload. But we believe that such an effort
nonetheless would prove to be worthwhile. A series of parsimonious
fee awards would send a clear and important message to the plaintiffs'
bar-free riding and prosecution of nuisance litigation no longer will
194. Plaintiffs' attorneys then would be required to prove that those benefits were the
product of those attorneys' efforts.
195. Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966).
196. If the court concludes that a settlement is the product of tacit collusion between
plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants, it probably should refuse to approve the settlement. Courts
outside of Delaware have denied fee awards to plaintiffs' attorneys in a number of recent
corporate cases, where they concluded that plaintiffs' attorneys had free ridden on the efforts of
others or where they found that plaintiffs' tactical efforts had produced no significant benefits for
the shareholders that they purported to represent. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 72 (2d
Cir. 1999) (free riding on settlement of related employment litigation); Zucker v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 265 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2001) (tactical efforts produced no benefits); Fruchter v.
Florida Progress Corp., No. 99-6167CI-20, 2002 WL 1558220, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 20, 2002)
(analogizing plaintiffs' attorneys to "squeegee boys" who operate on urban street corners).
Professor Weiss, as counsel, drafted an objection to the attorneys' fee request that was filed by
his colleague, Professor Hoffman, in Fruchter.
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be profitable. Plaintiffs' attorneys, if they want to continue to receive
the generous fee awards to which they have become accustomed, will
have to change their approach to merger-related litigation. In the
future, they will have to shift their focus to identifying mergers in
which shareholders really are not being treated fairly and then
litigating vigorously to protect those shareholders' interests. Mergerrelated class actions probably would become far less common, but
those that are filed and prosecuted then are likely to produce far more
in the way of genuine protection of shareholders' interests. In short,
the benefits envisioned by the Delaware courts when they decided to
privatize enforcement of merger-related fiduciary duties might
actually be realized.
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Table 1: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 1999-2001

Variable
Number of
mergers
Value of deal
($million)
Annual sales
of target
($million)
Net income of
target
($million)
Assets of
target
($million)
Common
equity of
target
($million)
First-day
premium (%)
offered by
acquirorc
% of mergers
that were all
cash
% of mergers
where
acquiror has a
prior stake or
other
allegations of
self-dealing

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
104

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
460

6,170

Mean Values
1,999
Yes (p = 0.034)

772

Median Values
544
No (p = 0.082)

3,176

914

Yes (p = 0.003)

646

193

Yes (p = 0.000)

162

20

Yes (p = 0.003)

30

7

Yes (p = 0.000)

6,942

2,690

Yes (p = 0.038)

788

339

Yes (p = 0.000)

1,359

428

Yes (p = 0.001)

264

121

Yes (p = 0.000)

28.4

37.7

Yes (p = 0.002)

21.4

30.8

Yes (p = 0.003)

64.4

28.5

Yes (p = 0.000)

65.4

4.6

Yes (p = 0.000)

Significant
Difference? b

Mergers
with
Lawsuits

Mergers
without
Lawsuits

104

460

Significant
Difference?b

aMergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that
is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a value of
$100 million or more.
b At a 95% confidence level
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (preannouncement) day closing share price
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Table 2: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 1999

Variable
Number of
mergers
Value of deal
($million)
Annual sales
of target

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
37

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
192

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
37

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
192

6,121

Mean Values
1,586
No (p = 0.123)

785

Median Values
538
No (p = 0.199)

1,357

759

No (p = 0.148)

556

202

Yes (p = 0.006)

92

10

No (p = 0.120)

20

8

No (p = 0.089)

2,103

1,363

No (p = 0.292)

547

326

Yes (p = 0.0 18)

804

342

No (p = 0.08 1)

241

104

Yes (p = 0.000)

20.7

35.1

Yes (p = 0.000)

18.4

28.5

Yes (p = 0.008)

56.7

26.0

Yes (p = 0.001)

43.2

5.2

Yes (p = 0.000)

Significant b
Difference?

Significant
Difference?b

($million)

Net income of
target
($million)
Assets of
target
($million)
Common
equity of
target
($million)
First-day
premium (%)
offered by
acquirorc

% of mergers
that were all
cash
% of mergers
where
acquiror has a
prior stake or
other
allegations of
self-dealing

Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that
is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a value of
$100 million or more.
b At a 95% confidence level
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (preannouncement) day closing share price
a
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Table 3: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 2000

Variable
Number of
mergers
Value of deal
($million)
Annual sales
of target
($million)
Net income of
target
(million)
Assets of
target
($million)
Common
equity of
target
($million)
First-day
premium (%)
offered by
acquiror_
% of mergers
that were all
cash
% of mergers
where
acquiror has a
prior stake or
other
allegations of
self-dealing

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
47

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
169

7,863

Mean Values
2,677
No (p = 0.163)

4,060

916

255

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
47

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
169

935

Median Values
529
No (p = 0.138)

Yes (p = 0.013)

1,037

169

Yes (p = 0.000)

36

Yes (p = 0.007)

39

7

Yes (p = 0.000)

10,961

4,793

No (p = 0.163)

1,764

285

Yes (p = 0.000)

1,867

496

Yes (p = 0.012)

280

111

Yes (p = 0.000)

32.5

42.5

No (p = 0.060)

23.2

34.6

No (p = 0.070)

68.1

32.0

No (p = 0.000)

76.6

4.7

Yes (p = 0.000)

Significant
Difference?b

Significant
Difference?b

Mergers where the target company is a publicly traded company that
is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a value of
$100 million or more.
b At a 95% confidence level
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (preannouncement) day closing share price
a
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Table 4: Mean and Median Values for Qualifyinga Mergers, 2001

Variable
Number of
mergers
Value of deal
($million)
Annual sales
of target
($million)
Net income of
target
($million)
Assets of
target
($million)
Common
equity of
target

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
20

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
99

2,286

Mergers
with
Lawsuits
20

Mergers
without
Lawsuits
99

Mean Values
1,596
No (p = 0.462)

408

Median Values
565
No (p = 0.347)

4,461

1,213

No (p = 0.183)

566

208

Yes (p = 0.003)

76

12

No (p = 0.636)

39

7

No (p = 0.111)

6,447

1,676

No (p = 0.103)

732

561

No (p = 0.539)

1,191

480

No (p = 0.139)

292

164

Yes (p =0.013)

33.2

34.8

No (p = 0.838)

24.4

31.1

No (p

70.0

27.3

Yes (p = 0.001)

80.0

2.0

Yes (p = 0.000)

Significant
Difference?"

Significant
Difference?b

($million)

First-day
premium (%)
offered by
acquirorc
% of mergers
that were all
cash
% of mergers
where
acquiror has a
prior stake or
other
allegations of

=

0.653)

self-dealing
a Mergers

where the target company is a publicly traded company that
is incorporated in Delaware and where the transaction has a value of
$100 million or more.
b At a 95% confidence level
c Initial percent premium of offer price per share over previous (preannouncement) day closing share price
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Table 5: Logit Regressions: 1999-2001
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Constant
Acquiror
prior stake or
self-dealing
(1,0)
All cash (1,0)
First-day %
premium
Deal valuea

-2.77
(9.25)
3.63
(10.61)

-7.30
(7.62)
3.74
(10.27)

-2.66
(9.31)
3.49
(10.50)

-4.73
(7.47)
3.38
(9.90)

1.23
(3.73)
-0.02
(3.19)
0.10
(4.87)

1.67
(4.55)
-0.02
(3.00)

0.99
(3.15)
-0.01
(2.51)

0.95
(2.98)
-0.02
(2.63)

Ln (deal
value)

-2.54
(9.19)
3.48
(11.45)

0.97
(3.10)
-0.02
(2.60)

-2.35
(8.97)
3.46
(10.59)

0.83
(2.72)
-0.02
(2.74)

-5.39
(7.51)
3.38
(9.88)

-2.74
(9.32)
3.48
(10.34)

1.18
(3.56)
-0.02
(2.53)

1.12
(3.46)
-0.02
(2.769)

0.68
(5.84)

Target sales'

0.13
(3.85)

Ln (sales)

0.40
(4.61)

Target net

1.82
(4.12)

'

incomea b

Target assetsa

0.01
(1.78)

Ln (assets)

0.45
(5.06)

Target
commonb
equity'
Pseudo R
n
a
b

In $ billions

0.36
(4.97)

0.43
564

0.44
564

0.41
564

0.41
564

0.41
564

0.38
564

0.42
564

0.42
564

Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for
common equity were not performed
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Table 6: Logit Regressions: 1999
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Constant
Acquiror prior
stake (or selfdealing) (1,0)
All cash (1,0)
First-day %
premium
Deal valuea

-2.15
(5.28)
2.30
(4.41)

-7.42
(4.79)
2.74
(4.86)

1.38
(2.93)
-0.03
(-2.56)
0.11
(2.60)

1.90
(3.52)
-0.03
(2.38)

Ln (deal value)

1.14
(2.53)
-0.03
(2.49)

-3.76
(4.13)
2.28
(4.42)

-1.91
(5.10)
2.19
(4.26)

-1.84
(5.03)
2.26
(4.49)

-5.11
(4.41)
2.30
(4.37)

-2.09
(5.29)
2.24
(4.39)

1.15
(2.50)
-0.03
(2.51)

1.17
(2.58)
-0.03
(2.53)

1.08
(2.44)
-0.03
(2.58)

1.49
(2.99)
-0.03
(2.37)

1.30
(2.78)
-0.03
(2.54)

0.77
(3.98)
0.18
(1.75)

Target salesa
Ln (sales)

-1.99
(5.07)
2.22
(4.38)

0.34
(2.53)

____________________

2.62
(1.96)

Target net
incomeab
Target assets a

0.04
(1.32)
0.50
(3.23)

Ln (assets)

0.43
(2.83)

Target common
equity " b
Pseudo R 2
n
a
b

0.28
229

0.31
229

0.24
229

0.26
229

0.25
229

0.23
229

0.28
229

0.26
229

In $ billions
Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for
common equity were not performed
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Table 7: Logit Regressions: 2000
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Constant
Acquiror prior
stake or selfdealing (1,0)
All cash (1,0)
First-day %
premium
Deal value'

-3.20
(5.34)
4.24
(7.38)

-7.49
(4.71)
4.09
(7.02)

3.27
(5.57)
4.11
(7.36)

-4.94
(4.48)
3.59
(6.74)

1.39
(2.37)
-0.02
(2.05)
0.10
(3.55)

1.67
(2.68)
-0.02
(1.83)

1.05
(1.87)
-0.01
(1.28)

0.82
(1.56)
-0.01
(1.36)

Ln (deal value)

-3.00
(5.44)
4.00
(7.36)
1.06
(1.92)
-0.01
(1.39)

-2.52
(5.21)
3.88
(7.47)
0.75
(1.45)
-0.01
(1.48)

-5.36
(4.57)
3.62
(6.78)
1.06
(1.92)
-0.01
(1.22)

-3.15
(5.47)
3.97
(7.23)
1.15
(2.05)
-0.01
(1.31)

0.66
(3.64)

Target salesa

0.20

(3.68)
Ln (sales)

0.41
(2.84)

Target net

1.98
(3.59)

'

incomea b

Target assetsa

0.01

(1.16)
Ln (assets)

0.41
(3.08)

Target common
equity" b
Pseudo R2
n
a

b

0.36
(3.71)
0.54
216

0.52
216

0.55
216

0.50
216

0.52
216

0.46
216

0.50
216

0.52
216

In $ billions
Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for
common equity were not performed
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Table 8: Logit Regressions: 2001
Dependent variable: Law suit filed (Yes = 1; No = 0)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Constant
Acquiror prior
stake or selfdealing (1,0)
All cash (1,0)
First-day %
premium
Deal valuea

-3.70
(4.23)
5.39
(5.20)

-7.12
(2.63)
5.42
(4.97)

-3.71
(4.20)
5.28
(5.10)

-7.58
(3.68)
6.00
(4.61)

3.37
(4.27)
5.34
(5.23)

-4.27
(4.10)
5.85
(4.94)

-8.17
(3.36)
5.93
(4.60)

-3.74
(4.33)
5.35
(5.15)

1.00
(1.00)
-0.01
(0.82)
0.17
(2.18)

1.27
(1.18)
-0.01
(0.92)

0.97
(0.98)
-0.01
(0.56)

1.08
(1.04)
-0.02
(0.89)

0.70
(0.74)
-0.01
(0.59)

1.39
(1.26)
-0.02
(1.15)

1.12
(1.10)
-0.02
(0.95)

1.02
(1.02)
-0.01
(0.84)

0.58
(1.69)

Ln (deal value)

0.10
(2.45)

Target salesa

0.69
(2.68)

Ln (sales)

1.95
(1.80)

Target net
income" b
Target assetsa

0.15
(3.05)
0.71
(2.46)

Ln (assets)

0.44
(2.36)

Target common
equityb

Pseudo R
n
a In

b

0.62
119

0.61
119

0.63
119

0.66
119

0.61
119

0.69
119

0.64
119

0.64
119

$ billions
Because of negative values, log regressions for net income and for
common equity were not performed
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Table 9: OLS Regressions, 1999-2001
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent var.:
Constant
Non-monetary
settlement
Ln (target
assets)

Ln (legal
fee/case)
4.79 (6.15)
-1.17 (3.36)

Ln (legal
fee/case)
4.17 (6.71)
-1.32 (4.61)

0.31 (3.16)

Ln (hourly
rate/case)
0.617 (10.99)
-1.13 (4.36)

Ln (hourly
rate/case)
6.52 (12.96)
-1.28 (5.09)

0.15 (2.20)

Ln (deal value)
Court-ordered
reduction

-0.12 (0.31)

0.44 (5.04)
-0.31 (0.91)

-0.37 (1.37)

0.12 (1.75)
-0.43 (1.57)

R2
n

0.46
47

0.58
47

0.52
43

0.50
43
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Table 10: Cases Where the Delaware Courts Awarded Less than All
Fees Requested

No objection filed:
Name of case

Judge

IBP
Petco
MascoTech
CB Richard Ellis
PepsiAmericas

Strine
Lamb
Strine
Strine
Strine

% reduction
69%
37%
33%
21%
9%

Objection filed:
Name of case

Judge

BancTec
Donna Karan

Strine
Strine

% reduction
90%
78%

Note: These are cases where plaintiffs' attorneys were from the
"traditional" Delaware plaintiffs' bar.
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Figure 1: Means of M&A Deal Values
9,000
8,000
7,000

64,000
5,000

1,000.

1,000

Lawsuits,
1999-2001

No
lawsuits,

1999-2001

Lawsuits,
1999

No
lawsuits,
1999

Lawsuits,
2000

No
lawsuits,
2000

Lawsuits,

2001

No

lawsuits,
2001

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1874

[Vol. 57:5:1797

Figure 2: Means of Annual Sales of M&A Targets
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Figure 3: Means of Net Income of M&A Targets
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Figure 4: Means of Assets of M&A Targets
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Figure 5: Means of Common Equity of M&A Targets
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Figure 6: Means of M&A First-Day Premium
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Figure 7: % of M&A Deals That Were All Cash
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Figure 8: % of M&A Deals Where Acquirer Had Prior Stake or Conflict
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Figure 9: A Schematic Portrayal of Litigation Outcomes and Legal Fees,
1999-2001
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